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
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WITHIN THE UNITED STATES NAVY OFFICER CORPS

by

Edward Lawrence Sullivan

and

Patricia Ann Miller

December 1983

Thesis Advisor:

G. W. Thomas

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A comparison of sources of entry of minority officers into the military, and how the Navy differs from the other services, as well as the significance of such a difference, are presented. An examination of perceptions and career intentions of minority officers in the Navy and how they differ from those of minorities in other branches of the service are presented.

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A Comparative Examination of
Minority Participation within the
United States Navy Officer Corps

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines minority participation in the Navy officer corps, 1973 to 1983. Some comparisons of the experiences of white officers, and of the officer corps of other services, are introduced as yardsticks for the Navy minority experience. A brief history of minority military participation prior to the inception of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is presented. Demographic trends observable within the American population are presented and compared with planned manpower requirements for the next ten years. A brief description of minority experience in the Navy Officer Corps during the AVF era is presented.

A comparison of sources of entry of minority officers into the military, and how the Navy differs from the other services, as well as the significance of such a difference, are presented. An examination of perceptions and career intentions of minority officers in the Navy and how they differ from those of minorities in other branches of the service are presented.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

In 1976, the Department of Defense (DOD) concluded that institutional racial discrimination and discrimination against ethnic minorities had existed, and continued to exist, in all branches [Ref. 1]. There is some evidence to suggest that this discrimination continues today in a subtle manner and probably is most visible in the composition of the officer corps of the service.

The significance of racial discrimination existing in the officer ranks as opposed to such discrimination existing in the enlisted force, lies in the control that officers have within the military institution. Organizational changes in the military are made from the top downwards, not from the bottom up. Thus, elimination of discrimination must occur at the top first, if that elimination is to be permanent.

Using any of three of the more common measures of "equitable representation"--i.e., the minority percentage of the general population, the minority percentage of the enlisted force, and the minority percentage of the 'officer potential' pool of college graduates nationwide--none of the services have achieved proportionate representation after ten years of the All-Volunteer Force, either in distribution across occupations or in total numbers of minority officers. Two services, the Army and the Air Force are approaching equitable representation with regard to the percentage of the minority 'officer potential' pool. The Marine Corps has also made significant progress towards this target. The Navy, however, remains farthest from this and all other measures of "equitable" minority officer representation.

None of the services has achieved proportionate racial distribution in the middle or senior grade ranks. This is, at least partly, a function of time. The length of time needed to "grow" minority officers eligible for promotion to senior ranks still exceeds the period which has passed since the initiation of increased efforts to recruit minority accessions.

The overall participation rates of minorities, in the military, have been improving since the 1970 extension of Executive Order 11246 (requiring affirmative action as well as equal opportunity) to cover the Department of Defense. This improvement has been almost entirely due to the great increases in the minority composition of the enlisted force. (Paralleling the situation in the officer ranks, the Navy lags all other services in minority enlisted participation, except in Asian-American and Pacific Islander participation rates). Except for the Navy, the participation rates of minorities in all services greatly exceeds that of the minority percentages of the general population.

The importance of accomplishing higher racial representation rates arises both from questions of social equity and from an analysis of future Navy manpower requirements. This thesis deals only with the latter issue. Given the increasing manpower needs of the Navy and the changing proportions of the recruiting pool, it is clearly in the Navy's best interest to do a much better job of attracting minorities. The Navy cannot afford to ignore a population that already constitutes 16 percent of the general population, and is growing at a much faster rate than the general population.

B. BACKGROUND - HISTORY OF MINORITY PARTICIPATION POLICIES.

For most of its history, the nation's military has been a profession reserved for white Americans. The personnel policies have mirrored the racial prejudices prevalent in the rest of society. This has been modified only when forced by circumstances and only for as long as such circumstances prevailed.

Effectively, military planners accepted minorities as laborers with reasonable frequency, but allowed participation in enlisted combat roles only during times of great crisis and discontinued such participation as quickly as possible, after the crises had passed. With the exception of a very few chaplains and coastal pilots, no professional or officer employment of minorities was practiced by the military prior to World War II.

1. Revolutionary War to the Korean Conflict

The purpose of the militia during early Colonial times was to defend domestic order. There was no limit placed on any males, regardless of race or economic status. However, by 1639 fear of training future black rebels led to the adoption of legal provisions excluding blacks from military service in Virginia. Massachusetts and Connecticut followed suit in 1656 and 1661, respectively. Other colonies restricted black participation to musician, laborer and other auxillary functions. Periodic difficulties with the Indians and French forces caused temporary exceptions to this policy, to relieve manpower shortages to meet specific crises.

The Revolutionary War, which lacked the support of a considerable portion of the white population, caused a severe shortage of men willing to fight for independence. The initial recruitment of militiamen for this conflict took

men from all races and classes who could be induced to join. In 1775, however, the fears of slaveholders forced Washington to proscribe new enlistments of blacks. Those blacks already on duty were allowed to remain. Loose enforcement of this ban allowed the use of blacks to serve in place of whites, and active recruitment of blacks was carried on by various units in spite of it. Ultimately, the Continental Congress sanctioned black recruitment, and approximately 5,000 blacks served with the colonial forces [Ref. 2].

No blacks were formally authorized to serve in the Quasi-War with France in the 1790's or in the War of 1812. Several did serve without such official sanction. Other minorities were of insignificant numbers to matter during this period. The large influx of Hispanics occurred after the acquisition of Texas, California, the Louisiana Purchase and Florida. American Indians were largely regarded as enemies of the new republic and thus not considered candidates for enlistment, apart from limited use as Army scouts. Also, the Army and Navy of the United States during the years between 1814 and the start of the Civil War were small enough that minority manpower was not crucial. The Mexican War placed the only significant strain on the military, and even this was easily handled by the rapidly growing white population.

The Civil War allowed blacks to resume legal participation in military service, and in combat bearing arms. Initial concerns about border state loyalty kept Lincoln from openly allowing the use of blacks. At the unit levels, however, commanders took in blacks to meet manning requirements without regard to the official position of the government. After the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, active recruitment of blacks was conducted by all Union states. "Colored" units were formed and led by white

officers. This marked the start of unit segregation by race in the military. By the end of the war, blacks made up nearly 10 percent of the Union Army. Blacks were not admitted to either of the two services as officers. However, this war saw the use of blacks as coastal, river and harbor pilots by the Navy. While not accorded commissioned rank, service as pilots marked the first time blacks were officially regarded as professionals by the United States military [Ref. 2].

After the Civil War, black units were kept on active duty and used extensively in the Indian wars of the American West. Blacks were used in all functional roles in both the Army and Navy, except for the role of officer. In the Army, the segregated units were maintained. The Navy permitted blacks to serve without regard to segregated units. This was undoubtedly due more to the impracticality of segregation aboard ship than to enlightened social awareness. This situation continued until World War I. The segregated Army units and black members of the Navy fought in all major conflicts during the period including the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the Pershing expedition into Mexico.

World War I started with the percentage of blacks in the military roughly equal to their percentage of the general population. This remained so, throughout the war because of the selective service process which was used in filling manpower requirements. Significantly, during this conflict, the practice of using blacks primarily in service roles (food service, quartermaster, laundry and other logistic duties) returned in both the Army and Navy. The black Army units and the black sailors in non-service ratings were kept on and their numbers actually increased, but the bulk of new black recruits found themselves in menial roles.

Also during this conflict, the Navy began the recruitment of Philippine nationals into service-related billets. This would lead, after the war, to a virtual halt in the recruitment of blacks into the Navy. Also, both the Army and the Navy excluded blacks from their officer corps, with only a handful of exceptions (mainly black chaplains). The third service, the Marine Corps, then considered a more integral part of the Navy than it is today, did not use black recruits during the war and remained 'white only' in both its officer and enlisted ranks until World War II.

Following the Great War, the Navy informally restricted the use of blacks to the steward and messman ratings. This was the first occupational segregation policy instituted by the Navy. Ships remained integrated, however the practice of recruiting Filipinos into the service ratings greatly reduced the total number of blacks in the Navy. (An interesting side note to this practice is that it continues today, with Philippine Nationals being recruited into the Navy in all occupations not requiring security clearances. It is this practice which has resulted in a high percentage of non-black, non-Hispanic minority enlisted members in the Navy relative to the other services.)

The Army maintained its segregated black units during the years between the wars. The policy of an all-white officer corps was kept by all the services. The emerging air services, both the Army Air Corps and the Naval and Marine Corps aviation branches were kept completely segregated prior to the start of World War II. Two aspects of the military racial policies of this time, which should be noted, were the existence of the Army and Navy as separate arms of the government and the different natures of the two services.

The War Department, containing the Army, and the Navy Department each had cabinet level status and were not

required to coordinate their individual personnel policies. Also, prior to the great expansion of the Navy during World War II, the Navy was far more completely a seagoing service than it is today. The Navy was not only smaller than the Army; it was considerably less in evidence in normal American society. The issue of integrated ships was at least somewhat abstract to the bulk of society, which had little contact with ships in general, and with the Navy in particular. The Army, by contrast, maintained posts in every state and territory of the continental United States. Soldiers, while not forming a part of every community, were widespread geographically. This added to the pressure on the Army to at least be cognizant of the effect of integration as viewed by the non-military citizens.

The former factor, of the separate Army and Navy Departments, became important in 1940. During the election, pressure from the black community forced President Roosevelt to stipulate personnel policy for the War Department, which had the following main points: (1) the proportion of blacks in the Army would be that of blacks in the general population, (2) black units would be established in all branches (combatant and non-combatant) of the Army, and (3) blacks would be admitted to officer candidate schools so that they could serve as pilots in black aviation units [Ref. 2]. This last point was the first deliberate attempt to train blacks for duty as line officers in combat units.

This policy was not implemented by the Navy or Marine Corps, and the issue was not addressed by the Navy Department until the use of the draft was forced upon the sea services in the latter half of 1942.

During World War II, limited integration of the officer corps was achieved in all services. By the end of the war, black servicemen had participated in all theaters

and in all roles. However, the bulk of them had been relegated to non-combat units, and the goal of equaling the percentage of blacks in the general population was never achieved by any of the services.

During the war, the percentage of blacks in the Army achieved a high-water mark of 8.7 percent (officers and enlisted combined). The corresponding percentages for the Navy (4 percent) and Marine Corps (2.5 percent) were even farther from proportionate representation. Additionally, although the integration of Army and Marine Corps units was achieved in a few cases, segregation remained the rule in most units. Navy ships continued to be integrated with both blacks (as officers and enlisted) and Filipinos (enlisted only).

After the war, there was a significant tendency to back-slide by the services. Several things had changed however, and this tendency was strongly, and successfully, opposed by a more politically aware minority population. The armed services, now numbering four (with the addition of the Air Force), were gathered into a single department, and personnel policies were now applied across the board. In 1948, Executive Order 9981 formally required equal opportunity of treatment in the services. There was considerable foot dragging, especially by the Army.

Despite this resistance, it may fairly be claimed that from this point on, the military stayed ahead of society in general in creating opportunities for minorities. Discrimination had not ended, but it had lessened considerably and formal policies of redress were made available to minority service members. The struggle now shifted to various forms of institutional discrimination against minorities--such as the lack of officer recruiting efforts on the campuses of predominantly black colleges--which in large part, reflected the current status quo in society. The

proportions of minorities in the officer ranks and in the better paid and preferred enlisted occupations improved at a slow pace.

2. Korea through Vietnam

After Korea, slow but steady progress was made. In 1954 the last all-black units were either abolished or integrated. During the Vietnam buildup, the proportions of blacks in the military steadily improved. Complaints of inequity came to center more on the selective service mechanism and recruitment standards. In sharp contrast to previous wars, black servicemen bore a disproportionate percentage of the burdens of combat, including battle deaths and injuries. Additionally, educated, healthy blacks tended to disproportionately bear the brunt of military service, relative to the entire black population.

Another unique function of the military during this period was its use by the government as a social tool in rectifying inequities in society at large. The military was seen as a path for advancement for disadvantaged members of society. It was particularly useful as a means to provide better employment and training opportunities for minorities. As part of the "War on Poverty", Project One Hundred Thousand (an essentially social program, involving the recruitment of 100,000 people from the disadvantaged segments of society per year), was created by President Johnson. This resulted in the enlistment of 246,000 people over a three-year period, who otherwise would have been excluded from military service for sub-par educational achievement. Forty percent of this group was black.

As racial tensions increased in society, the military began to experience violent racial incidents in the late sixties and early seventies, running about five years behind society in this regard. These incidents had only a

minor impact on military operations, but did signify that the military had lost its vanguard position in the area of equal opportunity for minorities. Society in general was now advancing at a faster rate than the services.

3. Post Vietnam

After the Vietnam War, the implementation of affirmative action, as well as equal opportunity programs helped to reduce discrimination in the enlisted ranks. This process continued through the start of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and applied to all minorities. The one very noticeable area where little progress was being made was in the officer ranks. It is also during this period that significant numbers of Hispanics began to join the services. There begin to be two sizeable minorities in the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, and three in the Navy which has retained the practice of enlisting Filipinos and therefore has a large percentage of Asians/Pacific Islanders.

Except in this last group, the Navy begins at this point (1973, the start of the AVF) to be left behind by the other services in attracting and retaining minorities. This is especially true in the Navy officer corps. The ranks of Navy enlisted minorities grew more slowly than did those of the other services, and still (as of 1983) are far smaller than the Defense Department averages. However, by 1983, the Navy has achieved roughly the same proportion of enlisted minority accessions as exists in the general population (12 percent).

C. SUMMARY

This thesis examines the period from 1973 to the present. This period starts three years subsequent to the initiation of affirmative action programs and covers the

whole of the All-Volunteer Force era. This examination is limited to details of minority participation in the Navy officer corps. Some comparisons, relative to the experiences of white officers and relative to the officer corps of the other services, are introduced as yardsticks for the Navy minority experience.

Chapter One presents a brief history of minority participation in the United States Armed Forces prior to the inception of the All-Volunteer Force.

Chapter Two presents observable demographic trends within the general American population and compares them with planned Navy manpower requirements for the next ten years.

Chapter Three presents a brief description of the minority experience in the Navy officer corps during the all volunteer Era, 1973-1983. This includes some comparisons with the experience of the other services.

Chapter Four presents a comparison of sources for entry by minorities into the military officer corps, and how the Navy differs from the other services in this regard, as well as the significance of such a difference.

Chapter Five presents an examination of the perceptions and career intentions of junior officers in all branches of the military and analyzes how the perceptions and intentions of minority officers in the Navy differ from those of minority officers in the other services.

II. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND RELEVANT DEMOGRAPHICS

This chapter examines the increases in the Navy's demand for manpower and the changing nature of the supply of available manpower in American society. In particular, the planned growth of the Navy officer ranks and the 'shrinking pool' of potential officer candidates is addressed; as well as the growing minority proportion of that 'shrinking pool'.

A. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The main driving force behind minority participation in the military in the past has been the need for sufficient manpower to meet military crises, or white shortfalls during times of peace. The issue of equitable treatment for minorities has been either ignored (as it was throughout the pre-Civil War period) or relegated to secondary consideration. Today, even though equity has become an important consideration, and indeed continues to grow in importance, the requirement for manpower still exerts a decisive force for equal opportunity. The services require large numbers of recruits each year to maintain the largest peacetime military force in our history. The end-strength of active duty personnel for all of the Department of Defense is planned to grow by 10 percent, from 2.07 million in FY 81 to 2.29 million in FY 87 [Ref. 3].

1. The 600 Ship Navy

The Reagan Administration has committed itself to an activist foreign policy and to a buildup of the Nation's defenses. A major part of these commitments is the creation of a 600 ship, fifteen battlegroup Navy, by 1990 [Ref. 3].

The Navy will grow by 15 percent, from 527,000 to 607,000 in end-strength over the six-year period starting in FY 81. This substantial growth in naval forces will increase the Navy's demand for manpower. Throughout the remainder of the decade, the Navy must compete successfully in the labor market to attract a growing number of recruits and to retain qualified personnel. Additionally, the ongoing modernization of the Navy and its increasing reliance upon high technology systems has caused the demand for top quality recruits to grow even faster than the overall demand.

Similar trends in civilian, and federal agencies, are also making the retention of high quality personnel an increasing problem. This is especially critical in the officer ranks. The last ten years have seen a dramatic shift in emphasis on engineering and hard science education requirements for officer candidates. As outlined below, the pool of young (under 30) college-trained minority people is still small. The members of this pool who have received a technical education are few in number, and much sought after by industry as well as by the other services.

2. Department of Defense Expansion

The expansion of the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps and the resulting competition for qualified officer candidates is the second most important factor, after the increased need of the Navy itself, in complicating the problem of improving minority officer participation. As outlined below, these services will also be trying to increase their 'catch' from the small pool of potential minority officer candidates.

The outlook for the Army throughout the remainder of the 1980's is for an expansion of end-strength of only 3 percent, from 781,000 in FY 81 to 807,000 by FY 87. This is the smallest percentage increase of any of the services.

However, at the same time, the Army is greatly increasing its level of technical sophistication. The Army maintains the largest Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) presence on civilian campuses and devotes the greatest amount of money and resources of any of the services to recruiting college students into its officer training programs. Additionally, it can point to a significantly better record than the Navy's, of minority progress up its officer ranks.

The Air Force will experience the largest growth both in percentage and total numbers over the next several years. This growth will be especially competitive with the goal of improving the Navy's minority officer participation, in that the Air Force is the most "officer intensive" of the services. Overall, the Air Force expects to grow by 18 percent, from 570,000 to 670,000 by 1987. Additionally, the Air Force has traditionally enjoyed higher retention rates than the other services and, like the Army, can boast a better record of minority progress than the Navy in the officer ranks. The Air Force also possesses a larger ROTC presence on civilian campuses than the Navy. Moreover, the Air Force will be competing directly for the technically-trained officer candidates that the Navy is trying to attract.

The Marine Corps expansion, while only 7 percent (totaling 22,000 by FY 87), has particular importance for the Navy's recruiting drive. In the critical area of officer recruiting, the Marine Corps is the major competitor for Naval Academy and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) graduates. Although the Marine Corps has done better than the Navy in minority officer participation, it still will be trying to improve its performance. Since the Marine Corps competes directly for the most select pool of potential Naval officers (those who have shown strong enough interest to join NROTC or the Academy and have met the

requirements) it too will be an impediment in improving minority officer participation rates in the Navy.

TABLE I
Planned DOD Growth FY 1981-87

(figures in thousands)

SERVICE	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	%chg
Army	731	784	782	783	791	799	807	3
Navy	529	542	560	576	591	601	607	15
USMC	191	192	195	197	199	201	203	7
USAF	570	581	593	617	639	653	670	18
DOD	2071	2099	2130	2173	2220	2254	2287	10

note: Navy numbers exclude TARS (reserves on active duty for training and administration of reserves)

Source: Military Manpower Task Force, October 1982

TABLE II
DOD Growth Achieved as of 31 MAR 83

Service	Amount (in thousands)	%Chg	%Plan
Army	782	--	--
Navy	555	5	34
USMC	199	4	61
USAF	592	3	22
DOD	2127	3	26

Source: Defense Almanac,
September 1983

Table I presents the planned growth of each of the services for the period, and table II shows the growth achieved as of 31 March 1983. The column in table II labeled 'Percent Plan' measures the amount of the planned increase which has been reached by each service as of 31 March 1983. For example, the U. S. Marine Corps has grown

by 4 percent since 1981. This represents 61 percent of the total growth which is planned for the Marines by 1987. The listings of not applicable for the Army reflect that only negligible growth was planned for the Army by 1983. The bulk of Army growth, as shown in table I, is to come in fiscal years 1984 through 1987.

TABLE III

DOD Officer Ranks: 31 MAR 1983

Service	Number (number in thousands)	% of Total Force
Army	104	13.2
Navy	67	12.0
USMC	19	9.8
USAF	103	17.5
DOD	293	13.8

Source: Defense Almanac,
September 1983

TABLE IV

Officer Corps Growth FY 81-87

Service	Amount	%growth
Army	8,000	8
USAF	13,000	13
USMC	2,000	11
(non-Navy Total	23,000)	
Navy	20,000	30

note: %growth based on FY 81 totals

Source: Military Manpower Task Force,
October 1982

The overall requirements for growth shown above include both enlisted and officer requirements. The Navy's problem is even more acute when the focus is narrowed to

officer growth alone. Table III depicts the size of the officer ranks relative to the entire force, and table IV shows the planned growth in those ranks. It is noteworthy that the two sea services have smaller ratios of officers to enlisted personnel than the other two services. This gives greater visibility to officers in these services and increases the importance of improving minority representation among the officer ranks. Also, given a relatively smaller officer corps and a greater opportunity for growth, it should be easier for the Navy to achieve more proportionate representation.

As shown in table IV, the Navy's requirement for additional officers is nearly equal to that of the rest of the Defense Department combined. Also, it should be noted that the Navy typically recruits approximately 10 percent of its officer corps each year, to replace leavers. This factor has held even during the relatively good retention achievements of the past three years. Without continued gains in retention, the twenty 20,000 new officers will come as additions to the normal turnover, which presently averages between 6,800 and 7,000 annually. As of 31 March 1983, the Navy had achieved a total officer corps of 67,062, up 1,180 from the starting level of 1981.

The large amount of growth planned for the Navy officer corps, relative to the other services, is influenced, at least in part, by the expected expansion of the Battle Force to fifteen battle groups. This entails the construction and operation of two additional battle groups, each built around a carrier and its air wing. Carriers and air wings are particularly officer intensive units, as compared to typical Army or Marine Corps ground units, and the training pipelines for these units are also very officer-intensive.

The requirements of American industry for college-educated minority employees has grown. All civilian firms dealing with the federal government and with many state and local governments must show compliance with federal regulations regarding equal opportunity and affirmative action. Additionally, political and economic pressure from the minority segments of the population have influenced industry to seek out and hire qualified racial and ethnic minorities. Civilian firms are a major source of competition with the military for college-educated and technically-educated minorities.

The problems mentioned above also apply to the recruiting of white officer candidates and enlisted personnel. As shown below, the declining number of white eligibles relative to the numbers of minorities entering the 18-24 age group give an added urgency to the problem of improving minority participation.

B. RELEVANT DEMOGRAPHICS

Since 1900 the population of the United States has grown from approximately 76 million to 226 million, with most of this growth (71.4 percent) occurring since 1940. As shown in table V, the minority percentage in the past thirty years has grown from roughly 10 percent of the total population to 14 percent and is expected to approach 18 percent by the turn of the century.

One potentially misleading aspect of table V is the method of accounting for Hispanics as a unique minority. Through the 1970 census, Hispanics were not counted separately. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race and were included mainly in the white category, with some being carried under black and other categories. Beginning in 1980, Hispanics have come to be listed in a separate

subcategory, but are counted mainly in the 'other' category, with some remaining as before in the black group.

TABLE V
Racial Composition - U.S. Population (1940-1980)

Selected Years				
Year	Total (in thousands)	%White	%Black	%Other
1940	132,165	89.6	9.7	0.7
1950	151,326	89.3	9.9	0.9
1960	179,323	88.6	10.5	0.9
1970	203,212	87.5	11.1	1.4
1980	226,546	85.9	11.8	2.3

Source: Bureau of Census

Within the general population, however, the military is primarily interested in the pool of young men (and to a lesser extent, young women) between the ages of 18 and 24 years. It is from the portion of this pool, consisting of persons qualified for military service, that nearly all of the recruits into the military are drawn each year. In this segment of the population, two important trends have developed since 1970. As shown in table VI, the input into this portion of the population peaked during 1975 and has decreased steadily since then. Additionally, the percentage growth of minorities in this age group has exceeded the percentages of minorities in the general population. An immediately apparent implication of these two trends, coupled with the need of the military to expand, is that the recruitment of increasing numbers of minorities may be necessary.

In addition, table VI shows that the overall population of 18-24 year olds is projected to decline by 21 percent over the next twelve years. Two other trends also have an influence on this pool: the increasing proportion of

TABLE VI

U.S. Population by Age and Sex - Selected Years, 1960-1995

(numbers in thousands)

Age Range (years) and Sex

year ----	14 - 17		18 - 21		22 - 24		18 - 24 total
	male	female	male	female	male	female	
1960	5,683	5,536	4,810	4,745	3,284	3,289	16,128
1970	8,108	7,816	7,444	7,275	5,007	4,986	24,712
1975	8,722	8,406	8,454	8,220	5,683	5,648	28,005
1980	8,226	7,910	8,903	8,621	6,440	6,373	30,337
1983	--	--	--	--	--	--	30,055
1984	--	--	--	--	--	--	29,476
1985	--	--	--	--	--	--	28,715
1990	--	--	--	--	--	--	25,777
1995	--	--	--	--	--	--	23,684

Source: Bureau of Census

minorities in this group and the changing ethnic mix of college enrollments.

Census projections for age groups by ethnic origin were not readily available. Tables VII and VIII compare the 1980 ethnic composition of 18-to 24-year-old group and the 10-to 14-year-old group. While not an exact projection, the composition of the 10-14 year old group does give a reasonable indication of the trend towards a greater minority representation in the 18-24 year group over the next several years, excluding migration effects.

Note: Tables VII and VIII are based on the 1980 census. This census counted persons of Hispanic origins as members of specific racial groups (ie., white, black, Native American, etc.) and as a separate ethnic group. Thus, the figures and percentages shown in the tables will not add up to 100 percent.

The enrollment mix of college students is shown in table IX, and high school enrollment percentages in table X. The trend toward a greater availability of educationally qualified minorities and a slightly lesser availability of

TABLE VII

Ethnic Composition 18-24 Age Group (1980)

Ethnicity -----	number (in thousands)		percentage	
	both sexes	males	both sexes	males
White	24,294	12,223	80.4	81.2
Black	3,914	1,885	13.0	12.5
Hispanic	2,240	1,158	7.7	7.7
Amerind	216	108	0.7	0.7
Asian	439	219	1.5	1.5
Total Minority	6,809	3,370	22.7	22.4
Overall Totals	30,022	15,054	100	100

note: percents and totals do not add up due to
rounding and double counting of Hispanics.

Source: Bureau of Census

TABLE VIII

Ethnic Composition 10-14 Age Group (1980)

Ethnicity -----	number (in thousands)		percentage	
	both sexes	males	both sexes	males
White	14,461	7,408	79.3	79.5
Black	2,673	1,344	14.7	14.4
Hispanic	1,475	747	8.1	8.0
Amerind	156	79	0.9	0.8
Asian	280	144	1.5	1.5
Total Minority	4,584	2,314	25.1	24.8
Overall Totals	18,242	9,316	100	100

note: percents and totals do not add up due to
rounding and double counting of Hispanics.

Source: Bureau of Census

qualified white candidates is clear. This re-emphasizes the need for the Navy to improve its record in minority officer participation.

As shown above, the minority proportion of college enrollment has grown from 11.7 percent to 15.2 percent during the first nine years of the AVF. Table X, shows that

this trend is continuing in the high schools, where the proportion of blacks and Hispanics has risen from 17.7 percent to 21.5 percent during the same period.

The data shown in tables IX and X offer an indirect indication of the fact, that in addition to struggling to comply with equal opportunity and affirmative action legislation, civilian employers will be finding young hires of any ethnic group increasingly scarce. Also, colleges may well be scrambling to maintain enrollments. The various efforts of employers and higher education to attract members of the smaller 18-24 year old group will directly increase the cost to the military of attracting these same people.

TABLE IX
College Enrollments

Year	-----	number (in thousands)			percentage		
-----	Total	White	Black	Hisp	White	Black	Hisp
1973	8,298	7,324	684	290	88.3	8.2	3.5
1974	8,949	7,781	814	354	86.9	9.1	4.0
1975	9,875	8,516	948	411	86.2	9.6	4.2
1976	10,133	8,644	1,062	427	85.3	10.5	4.2
1977	10,333	8,812	1,103	418	85.3	10.7	4.0
1978	9,911	8,514	1,020	377	85.9	10.3	3.8
1979	10,151	8,709	1,002	440	85.8	9.9	4.3
1980	10,325	8,875	1,007	443	85.9	9.8	4.3
1981	10,805	9,162	1,133	510	84.8	10.5	4.7

Source: Bureau of Census

Of particular interest to the Navy's minority officer recruitment efforts are the number of minorities who actually complete the requirements for a bachelor's degree and the number of such people who acquire bachelor's degrees in technical areas. Table XI provides such data for 1975-1979, for black and Hispanic graduates.

The extremely low percentages of technical degrees obtained by blacks and Hispanics have special significance

TABLE X
High School Enrollments

Year	number (in thousands)				percentage		
	Total	White	Black	Hisp	White	Black	Hisp
1973	15,893	13,091	2,044	758	82.3	12.9	4.8
1974	16,114	13,073	2,125	916	81.1	13.2	5.7
1975	16,371	13,224	2,199	948	80.8	13.4	5.8
1976	16,404	13,214	2,258	932	80.5	13.8	5.7
1977	16,407	13,152	2,327	928	80.2	14.2	5.6
1978	16,041	12,897	2,276	868	80.4	14.2	5.4
1979	15,748	12,583	2,245	920	79.9	14.3	5.8
1980	15,304	12,056	2,200	1,048	78.8	14.4	6.8
1981	15,360	12,062	2,168	1,130	78.5	14.1	7.4

Source: Bureau of Census

TABLE XI
Minority Bachelor Degrees 1975-1979

Bachelor Degrees Conferred
(totals in hundreds)

Year	Black	Hispanic	Total
1975-76	592 (6.4%)	262 (2.8%)	9271 (100%)
1976-77	585 (6.5%)	187 (2.1%)	8994 (100%)
1978-79	602 (6.7%)	297 (3.3%)	8985 (100%)

% Bachelor Degrees Conferred that are Technical

Year	Black	Hispanic	Total
1975-76	28 (.3%)	19 (.2%)	831 (9.0%)
1976-77	27 (.3%)	14 (.2%)	804 (9.0%)
1978-79	31 (.3%)	23 (.3%)	902 (10.0%)

Source: OP-130D

relating to the ROTC programs. Since 1976, the ROTC program has required that 80 percent of the students on full scholarship must major in engineering or hard sciences. The Naval Academy has a similar requirement.

The last demographic measure important to the issue of minorities in the military is the continuing low position of minorities on the socio-economic ladder. The most

frequently used measure of this phenomenon is the unemployment rate of minorities. Table XII compares this rate for the largest minority, blacks, with that of whites in the critical 18-24 year old group.

TABLE XII

Unemployment Rates by Sex, Age, & Race, 1982-1983

SEX-AGE		Total		White		Black	
		1982	1983	1982	1983	1982	1983
ALL	18-19	21.6%	21.7%	18.4%	18.1%	49.1%	48.3%
ALL	20-24	14.5%	15.1%	12.4%	12.6%	29.7%	32.6%
MALE	18-19	22.7%	22.2%	19.6%	18.2%	49.3%	49.3%
MALE	20-24	15.6%	16.5%	13.6%	14.2%	30.0%	32.3%
FEM	18-19	20.4%	21.1%	17.1%	17.9%	48.9%	47.1%
FEM	20-24	13.2%	13.4%	10.9%	10.6%	29.4%	33.0%

Source: U. S. Dept. of Labor, July 1983

The unemployment situation for other minorities is less easily captured due to such factors as the uncertain counting of Hispanics and the difficulty of establishing criteria for job searching status for illegal immigrants and reservation Indians. However, the poor comparison with white unemployment rates, similar to (if less extreme) than the blacks, seems to hold true for Hispanics and Native Americans.

Asians and Pacific Islanders present difficulties of measurement which stem from the diverse nature of this group. This minority is made up of large, well-established groups, such as the American-Chinese and Nisei Japanese, and newly arrived immigrants, such as the Vietnamese boat people. Unemployment rates vary widely across these groups.

One aspect of the unemployment is reasonably safe to generalize about--that is, the rates for the various minorities will very likely continue to exceed that of white

Americans for the next several years. High civilian unemployment rates usually result in increased applications for military enlistment, as individuals who would otherwise seek civilian jobs turn to the military as a second choice. Therefore, within the 'shrinking pool' of potential officer candidates, the minority segment should be somewhat easier to attract than their white cohorts.

III. MINORITY OFFICER PARTICIPATION, 1973-1983

The Selective Service was the overriding determinant affecting the composition of the armed forces from World War II through 1972. While careerists were volunteers (at least from the point of deciding to remain in the military) throughout this period, first term enlisted and initial obligation officers were a mixed group of draftees, draft-induced volunteers and unaffected (true) volunteers.

Since January 1973, all entry into military service has been entirely "voluntary", in the sense that there is no longer compulsory service. Extensions of military service beyond initial obligation have been voluntary, although there still exists the possibility of involuntary extension of active duty to six years after a voluntary entry into the service, regardless of the initial contract length.

This change in accession policy has had a significant impact on minority participation rates. Enlisted minority participation increased from 11 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 1975. Additionally, there was a 'skimming the cream' effect within the black community. As a result of service selection criteria, those 18-24 year old blacks who did join were better educated than the average 18-24 year old black and also came from an above average black socioeconomic background [Ref. 4].

Interestingly, while blacks rapidly became overrepresented within the Department of Defense, in relation to their percentage of the general population, Hispanics, Asians and other minorities have continued to be slightly under represented. This last factor serves to highlight the minority representation experience within the Navy, which has been somewhat the reverse of that in the Army and the Air Force.

A. MINORITY OFFICER STATUS AT THE START OF AVF ERA

With the nearly simultaneous ending of the Vietnam War and the end of the military draft, all the armed services found themselves competing for recruits into their officer training programs on the open market. The mandated requirement for affirmative action to increase the participation rates of minorities also complicated the recruitment problem. There was one mitigating factor: the services were reducing manning, from their wartime levels. For the first two to three years of the AVF, this reduction helped to ease both the transition into the non-draft environment and increasing the minority participation rates.

TABLE XIII

Minority Percents of Officer Corps by Branch, 30 June 1973

Service	Minority	Black	Hispanic	Other
Army	6.9	4.0	1.5	1.4
Navy	2.4	1.0	.8	.6
USAF	3.7	2.0	1.2	.6
USMC	3.4	1.8	1.3	.8
DOD	4.5	2.4	1.2	.8

(note: percents are limited to commissioned officers, warrant officers not included.)

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California

At the beginning of this period, the services varied widely in the degree and distribution of their minority officer participation. As shown, the Navy trailed all other services in its overall minority officer participation and differed in the distribution of those commissioned minorities which it did have. Table XIII and table XIV provide 'snapshots' of each of the services on 30 June 1973 and ten years later, on 30 June 1983.

TABLE XIV

Minority Percents of Officer Corps by Branch, 30 June 1983

Service	Minority	Black	Hispanic	Other
Army	15.0	9.0	1.2	4.7
Navy	7.4	2.8	1.0	3.7
USAF	9.5	5.2	1.9	2.4
USMC	6.0	3.9	1.1	1.0
DOD	10.5	5.8	1.4	3.4

(note: percents are limited to commissioned officers, warrant officers not included.)

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California

While these snapshots do not provide rigorous grounds for a statistical analysis of the minority officer recruitment policies of the services, they do serve as a baseline against which to measure minority participation in the officer ranks and as indicators of the extent to which each service has managed to improve its standing in this regard.

It can be seen that while the Navy has increased its percentage of minority officers, it has remained distinctly below the Department of Defense average. The Navy, in contrast to the other services, has achieved a disproportionate amount of its growth from among the non-black, non-Hispanic minority groups. Warrant officers were not included in this study because of the large differences in the numbers of warrant officers among the services (which in 1983 ranged from over 14,000 in the Army to none in the Air Force) and the significant differences in method of entry, into the warrant ranks, among the three services which do use warrant officers.

Figures 3.1 through 3.5 show the differing rank distribution of minority officers by service. In each case, the overall rank distribution and that of each of three minority groups, Blacks, Hispanics and all other minority officers, are compared. The rank distribution of the entire

commissioned portion of the Department of Defense is also included for comparison.




Figure 3.1 Percent Distribution of Navy, 30 June 1973.




Figure 3.2 Percent Distribution of Army, 30 June 1973.

The data upon which Figures 3.1 through 3.5 are based are included in appendix (A). The distribution of black




Figure 3.3 Percent Distribution of Air Force, 30 June 1973.

officers in the Navy differed markedly from that of all other officers in the Navy and from that of both black and




Figure 3.4 Percent Distribution of Marine Corps, 30 June 1973.

non-black officers within the Army and Air Force. Sixty-five percent of the black officers in the Navy and 72 percent in




Figure 3.5 Percent Distribution of DOD, 30 June 1973.

the Marine Corps were in the two lowest commissioned ranks in June of 1973. This is much higher than the 29 percent black distribution found in those two ranks across all of the Department of Defense.

The distribution of all minority officers was very similar to that of white officers in both the Army and Air Force. Also the distribution of Hispanic officers in the Navy and Marine Corps was similar to that of white officers. Other minorities, ie., non-black and non-Hispanic, had a distribution skewed toward the two junior ranks in the Marine Corps, but they did, in fact, follow the distribution of all officers in the Navy in this regard.

TABLE IV

Percent Distribution Minority Officers, 30 June 1973

Branch	Total Minority	Black	Hispanic	Other	All Offs
Army	51.9	55.1	42.8	55.8	33.7
Navy	11.8	9.5	14.2	14.9	22.1
USAF	31.9	31.0	36.9	55.8	38.3
USMC	4.4	4.4	6.1	2.2	5.9
DOD	100	100	100	100	100

(note: percentages are limited to commissioned officers, warrant officers not included.)

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California

The distribution of the total minority officer corps across the services relative to the proportion of commissioned officers assigned to each branch at the start of the AVF is shown in table XV.

B. NAVY OFFICER CORPS DURING AVF ERA

Starting with a particularly low percentage of minority officers in general and both the lowest and most junior representation of black officers, the Navy has improved its own record during the AVF era, but has not improved relative to the rest of the Department of Defense. As shown in table XVI, the first four years of the All-Volunteer Force saw an

TABLE XVI

Navy Minority Officer Percents, 1973-1983

Year	Black	Hisp	Minority	Total Offs
1973	1.0	1.0	2.2	62500
1974	1.2	1.0	2.7	60100
1975	1.3	1.0	4.0	58700
1976	1.5	1.0	4.0	57300
1977	1.8	1.0	3.7	60600
1978	2.1	1.0	4.7	60500
1979	2.2	1.1	5.0	59400
1980	2.4	0.7	5.7	60200
1981	2.4	0.7	6.6	61100
1982	2.8	0.9	5.6	62700
1983	2.8	1.0	7.3	66700

(note: total officers rounded to nearest hundred, includes all commissioned officers on active duty on 30 June of each year.)

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California

increase of 85.8 percent in the total minority participation rate in the Navy officer corps. Retention efforts and the reduction of the Navy officer corps by more than 5800 from 1973 to 1976 account for a part of this growth. However, the larger part of this growth came from new minority accessions.

Figure 3.6 outlines the rise in the minority percentage of officer accessions. With the exception of a small dip in 1977, there has been a steady increase in this area. An interesting aspect of the growth of the minority officer accessions is that more than half of the new minority officers were not black. Even though the black segment made up the bulk of the total minority population, blacks have averaged only 39 percent of the total minority input to the Navy officer corps thus far during the AVF era.

As shown in figure 3.7, the non-black percentage has been consistently near 60 percent, with the exception of 1979. This differential minority participation is most noticeable in the Navy, but also occurs in the Marine Corps.




Figure 3.6 Navy Minority Officer Participation, 1973-1983.

The participation rates and minority distributions of accessions in the Army and Air Force do not show such a great divergence between blacks and non-black minorities. Chapter five examines some aspects of this divergence within the Navy.

Along with the improvement in total numbers of minority officers, the Navy has also improved its distribution of minority officers, especially that of black officers, across the rank structure. The proportion of minority officers in the Navy, relative to their proportion of the Defense Department has also improved. However, the Navy and Marine Corps still remain disproportionately lower in this regard than the Army and Air Force. The rank distribution graphs for the Navy and the Department of Defense 30 June 1983 are shown below in figures 3.8 and 3.9. The corresponding graphs for the other services are included in appendix (A).




Figure 3.7 Non-Black Minority to Minority Accession, 1973-83.

Table XVII shows the change in proportional representation on 30 June 1983. It also shows the relative growth of the Navy and Marine Corps officer corps within the Department of Defense since 1973. This relative growth from 28 percent of the total Department of Defense officer manning in 1973 to 30.5 percent ten years later, is another reflection of the sea services continued low standing in minority active duty officer distribution.

C. FUTURE MINORITY OFFICER PARTICIPATION

The issue of minority officer accessions is a continuing matter of concern to the Navy. The present goal is to increase the 1983 minority officer percentage of 7.4 percent to 11 percent by 1988. Within that goal, the following minimums have been set: 6 percent black, 3 percent Hispanic




Figure 3.8 Percent Distribution of Navy, 30 June 1983.




Figure 3.9 Percent Distribution of DOD, 30 June 1983.

and 2 percent other minorities. The last minimum has already been surpassed. Table 3.6 below details the accession targets by race for the next five years.

TABLE XVII

Percent Distribution of Minority Officers, 30 June 1983

Branch	Total Minority	Black	Hispanic	Other	All Offs
Army	45.8	50.4	27.8	45.4	32.2
Navy	16.9	11.6	16.9	26.0	23.9
USAF	33.5	33.5	49.9	26.7	37.3
USMC	3.8	4.5	5.4	1.9	6.6
DOD	100	100	100	100	100

(note: percents are limited to commissioned officers, warrant officers not included.)

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California

TABLE XVIII

Navy Minority Officer Accession Plan, 1983-1988

Race	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Black	510	544	579	596	613	630
Hisp	310	333	356	368	379	390
Other	122	128	135	143	147	150
Total	942	1005	1070	1107	1139	1170

(note: figures represent goals to be achieved and not upper limits of minority accessions.)

Source: OP-130D

This chapter has examined the past decade's experience in minority officer participation. Prediction, to borrow from Mark Twain, is always difficult, especially when it involves the future. The planned accessions and the encouraging successes, which have recently been achieved in recruiting, give only part of the picture. The following chapter deals with retention and the method of entry for minorities. The past ten years have seen only moderate success in improving the participation rates of minorities within the Navy's officer corps. More effort is needed.

IV. MINORITY OFFICER RETENTION AND METHOD OF ENTRY

The retention of minority naval officers during the all-volunteer era has generally been good. The overall minority officer retention rates since 1979 have been comparable with those of white officers and, in several instances, better than those of white officers. The retention rates within the individual warfare specialty communities and the various staff corps are not very reliable due to the very small sizes of the minority cohorts within each. This matter of small cohort size also applies to the overall retention rates of minorities prior to 1979.

The periods of initial obligation for first term officers varies widely by source of commission, training programs entered into during the first few years of service, and by branch. Additionally, 'early out' and 'reduction in force (RIF)' programs were operated differently by each of the services during the first several years of the AVF. Moreover, the promotion flow rates, which have a significant impact on career intentions have varied, and still continue to vary, between the services and over the length of the AVF era. For all of these reasons, we have elected not to compare minority retention rates across the services. This chapter only examines the retention of minority officers, compared to the retention of white naval officers, within the Navy.

The examination of method of entry for minority officers includes some Department of Defense-wide comparisons, and gives particular emphasis to the record of the three service academies.

A. RETENTION

The most common measure of retention rates for officers is the Minimum Service Requirement (MSR) method. In this method, the number of a given cohort still on active duty at minimum service requirement minus one year (MSR-1) is taken as a base figure and tracked out to two years beyond the minimum obligation. The retention rate is obtained by comparing the number remaining on active duty at the MSR+2 point to the original MSR-1 base.

The difficulty, in obtaining an ethnic-specific retention rate, lies in allowing for the differing initial obligations incurred at point of entry. These initial obligations are now typically four years, as in the case of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS). The obligations have ranged from five years, for academy graduates, down to three years, for OCS officers commissioned early in the AVF era and contract ROTC (C) commissioned officers.

The issue can be further complicated by the accrual of additional obligation during the first few years of active duty. For instance, an academy graduate may apply for and be accepted into flight training, two or three years into his or her initial obligation. Flight training tacks on a concurrent four-year obligation which runs from the starting date of training.

For all of the above reasons, the use of retention rates obtained by the MSR method is risky. Table XIX, supplied by OP-136D, the Officer Procurement Plans section, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training, gives the retention rates for the various ethnic categories for fiscal 1979 through 1983. Officer retention rates for Hispanics was not available for fiscal years 1979 through 1981.

TABLE XIX

Officer Retention Rates, 1979-1983

Year ---	White		Black	
	URL	Staff	URL	Staff
FY 79	37	34	56	34
FY 80	42	57	45	66
FY 81	46	67	64	58
FY 82	57	64	57	66
FY 83	54	64	59	58
---	Hispanic		Other	
	URL	Staff	URL	Staff
FY 79	na	na	41	90
FY 80	na	na	48	82
FY 81	na	na	48	63
FY 82	54	52	50	47
FY 83	60	41	64	47

note: Hispanic rates included in 'Other'
rates for FY 79-FY 81

Source: OP-136D

The higher retention of minorities since 1979 may well be due to the poor economic condition of the economy which started to worsen at about that time. Other factors affecting minority retention are examined in chapter five.

Another, even rougher, gauge of retention is the number of minority officers staying on active duty beyond six years. The best that can be said for this method is that it does provide a good understanding of the ethnic composition of the careerist portion of the officer corps. This gauge measures the minority population at a point when virtually all officers are passed the period of initial obligation. The major component which distorts this measure is the commissioning of officers with prior enlisted service.

Table XX, makes no allowance for officers with prior enlisted service. The assumption is made that persons with prior enlisted service who accept an officer's commission, with its required initial obligation of from three to five years of service beyond commissioning, are very likely to

TABLE XX

Selected Length of Service Statistics, Naval Officers

Year		White	Black	Hisp	Other	Total
1973						
	Over 6	36600	236	260	100	37180
	% 6+	60%	39%	57%	34%	60%
1978						
	Over 6	39300	600	370	260	40500
	% 6+	68%	48%	57%	35%	67%
1983						
	Over 6	41000	1084	349	1158	43700
	% 6+	67%	57%	53%	50%	66%

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California

remain on active duty well beyond six years in any case, regardless of ethnic origin.

Table XX displays the number of officers staying on beyond six years ("careerists") for each of the ethnic categories, and the percentage that this number represents of the total number of that minority group in the officer corps as a whole. For example, 60 percent of all white officers on active duty in 1973 had six or more years of service. This percentage grew to 67 percent by 1983.

As shown in table XX, there has been a rise in the number of careerists in all ethnic categories, except Hispanic, since 1973. The greatest increase in the percentage of officers staying on active duty beyond six years has been in the 'other' category. A further breakdown of this category reveals that most of the growth since 1979 has been in the Asian/Pacific Islander ethnic group. Blacks have shown the next best improvement. All minorities, however, continue to lag behind whites in this measure. This is consistent with the opening of opportunities for minorities in the officer ranks being a fairly recent phenomenon.

TABLE XXI

Overall Officer Retention Rates by Source, 1976-1983

(Percent)

Source	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
USNA	67	62	57	41	44	46	50	55
NROTC (R)	38	34	37	36	38	41	46	53
NROTC (C)	24	24	29	25	35	39	49	39
OCS	19	27	44	58	61	77	60	63
AOCS	54	54	48	29	31	47	45	59
NESEP	92	92	92	89	87	82	75	79

Source: OP-136D

The overall retention rates by source of commissioning are shown in table XXI. (The Naval Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP) has been discontinued, but is shown because it was a major source of commissioning during the first several years of the AVF). There is a brief explanation of the different commissioning sources, listed in table XXI, in the next section of this chapter.

The presently planned growth in the numbers of black and Hispanic officers, from 1983 inventories of 2,666 (black) and 1,110 (Hispanic) to 1988 inventories of 4,458 and 2,229, respectively, is based upon 50 percent retention over that period. By 1988, the Navy plans to achieve 6 percent black and 3 percent Hispanic representation in its officer corps [Ref. 5].

B. METHOD OF ENTRY

Where do the military's minority officers come from? The source of commissioned minority officers has important implications for all other aspects of minority participation in the Navy officer corps. The way in which a commission is obtained has a considerable bearing upon ultimate rank achieved and upon initial performance in the various training pipelines of at least the surface and aviation

communities. The source of commission often determines the type of commission, either regular or reserve. The importance of this difference in initial type of commission varies over time. However, the crux of the matter is that a reserve officer must be augmented into the regular force in order to continue a career on active duty. (This does not apply to the Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) community, a small group of reserve officers ostensibly kept on active duty to administer the reserve training program).

Thus, the issue of whether the initial commission is reserve or not, is important in times when the force is being reduced or when sufficient regular officers are electing to remain on active duty. Reserve officers are then liable to be involuntarily discharged from active duty by means of non-selection for augmentation in the regular force. Even during periods of expansion, the augmentation screening is a hurdle not faced by those who are initially commissioned as regular officers.

The commissioning sources of the Navy, which closely parallel those of the other services, are Direct Accession, the Naval Academy, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, Officer Candidate Schools, and enlisted commissioning programs. These programs are briefly described below.

1. Direct Accession

This is largely used for obtaining officers who are already trained in a particular skill which is desired by the Navy. Physicians, dentists, lawyers and chaplains are typical examples of direct accession officers. Other specialists are also obtained in this manner. It is very rare for an unrestricted line officer (URL) to be accessed in this manner, almost all direct accessions are commissioned into staff corps and as such are not eligible to succeed to command of operational Navy units.

2. Naval Academy

This is a four-year undergraduate program which confers both a Bachelor of Science degree and a regular commission in either the Navy or the Marine Corps. Prior to the admission of women to all the service academies, nearly all officers were commissioned directly into the line. Since 1980, the percentage of academy graduates entering staff corps has increased. The initial obligation upon commissioning is five years on active duty. Included in this category are the small numbers of officers commissioned from the Military (West Point) and Air Force Academies into the Navy.

3. Reserve Officer Training Corps

This program is administered on civilian campuses throughout the nation. There are two variations of this program, a four-and a two-year program. The four-year program is a fully funded scholarship program involving four summer sessions and academic courses in each of the four undergraduate years. This program leads to a regular commission in either the unrestricted line community of officer specialties (such as aviation, surface, or general line designators) or one of the staff corps. The two-year program is a partially funded scholarship, involving two summer sessions and academic courses during the last two years of undergraduate work. This program leads to a reserve commission in either the line or one of the staff corps. Typically the majority of ROTC commissioned officers from both programs are commissioned into the line.

The commission from either of the programs is four-years of active duty. (Reserve officers have been given the opportunity to leave active duty early at various times in the past, most recently during the three years following the

end of the Vietnam War.) The ROTC program also includes those officers who are commissioned into the Naval Reserve from the Merchant Marine Academy and the various state-run maritime academies. Such officers have the option of requesting to come on active duty rather than serve in the reserves. Furthermore, a percentage of each year's ROTC graduates of both programs is commissioned into the Marine Corps.

4. Officer Candidate Schools

There are two large officer candidate schools run by the Navy. Both accept college graduates for training as naval officers and both offer reserve commissions mainly into the line but, as with ROTC, some officers are commissioned into staff corps. The Aviation Officer school in Pensacola, Florida trains personnel for aviation duty as pilots or flight officers. The Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island trains officers to be general line or surface warfare officers. A number of general line officer graduates of both schools proceed immediately to training as supply or intelligence staff corps officers. Unlike the Academy and ROTC programs, all officers from the officer candidate schools are commissioned into the Navy.

5. Enlisted Commissioning Programs

These programs have been much reduced in size with the end of the NESEP or Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program. This promotion now lies mainly through the Limited Duty Officer (LDO) program which leads to a regular commission. This and the smaller number of officers promoted on a case-by-case basis do not add sufficient people to the total accessions to affect minority participation rates, and thus were not considered in this study.

The most noticeable characteristic of minority officer accessions is the difference, as compared with white accessions, in distribution across the sources of commissions. Table XXII shows the distribution which occurred during the first year of the AVF. The percentage of minority officers coming in from OCS was nearly twice that of white officers. Within the minorities, the black proportion of OCS inputs was much higher than that of other minorities.

6. Academic Preparatory Programs

In addition to the pre-commissioning programs, there exist two important academic prep programs, which lead into the commissioning programs. These are the Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection and Training (BOOST) program and the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS). Both of these programs are aimed at opening an academic path for fleet sailors and recruits to the officer ranks.

The BOOST program places sailors and recruits who meet the requirements in a basic mathematics and verbal skills refresher course. Those candidates who are successful in this preparatory course and meet entrance requirements at a school with an ROTC unit, and obtain a combined minimum SAT score of 950, are eligible for assignment to a four-year ROTC scholarship. At present, in 1983, 80 percent of BOOST students are minorities. Over the last ten years, very few BOOST graduates have successfully completed college and been commissioned [Ref. 6]. The percentage of BOOST graduates remaining into their senior years has been increasing and this program shows some promise of being useful in increasing the number of minority candidates who are commissioned through ROTC.

NAPS, in contrast to the BOOST program, has been in existence throughout the post-World War II period. Also,

unlike BOOST, it is aimed at placing officer candidates into a single commissioning program: the Naval Academy. The scope of the NAPS program is considerably wider than that of BOOST. In addition to courses in mathematics and verbal skills, courses for chemistry, physics, and an introduction to computers are included in the curriculum.

Being able to pattern the NAPS curriculum directly on that of its only customer, gives NAPS an advantage over the BOOST program. Its success rate has been relatively good throughout the AVF period and has been improving. Most importantly, for purposes of increasing minority participation, NAPS has traditionally processed high school candidates who are recruited into the Navy for the express purpose of attending the Naval Academy and being commissioned into the officer ranks. In addition, NAPS also accepts fleet and Marine Corps enlisted input.

TABLE XXII

Percent Distribution of Officer Accessions, by Source 1973

Source	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Total Minority
Other	11	5	13	8	8
Academy	22	5	10	8	7
ROTC (R)	16	4	10	10	7
ROTC (C)	3	2	2	2	2
OCS	33	76	48	41	60
Dir Appt	8	1	3	29	9
Av Trng	7	7	10	2	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California

Table XXII shows the percent distribution of officer accessions across sources by race for the year 1973. By 1982, the distribution had changed. Though it would be incorrect to say that any definite overall pattern had

emerged, there has been a steady lessening of the importance of OCS as a minority commissioning source. The percentage distribution data for 1973-82 is included in appendix (B). Minority officer accessions had drawn nearly equal, in relative terms, with that of white accessions in academy commissions and had become much less restricted to the OCS pipeline. However, minorities remained very low in ROTC(R) commissions. (The highest rate achieved during the period was 15 percent in 1975 and 1977, and this source has been steadily decreasing since then.) This is significant in that ROTC(R) is half of the major source of regular commissions, the other major source of regular commissions being the academies.

TABLE XXIII

Percent Distribution of Officer Accessions, by Source 1982

Source	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Total Minority
Other	17	19	13	7	12
Academy	15	15	25	11	14
ROTC (R)	11	4	0	5	4
ROTC (C)	2	4	2	1	2
OCS	36	46	41	18	31
Dir Appt	5	3	7	56	29
Av Trng	14	8	12	4	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California

Table XXIII shows the percent distribution of officer accessions across sources by race for the year 1982. Tables XXIV through XXVI display the current (as of first quarter of fiscal 1984) minority officer accession goals. These goals represent 'targets or minimums to achieve' and not 'quotas or maximums not to exceed'. The overall accession goals by race are included in appendix (B). These

TABLE XXIV

Minority Officer Accession Plan - Blacks

Source	Fiscal Year				
	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
USNA	30	32	54	68	80
ROTC	95	100	105	110	115
OCS	157	160	160	160	160
AOCS	75	85	85	85	85
Enl Comm	75	80	80	80	80
Dir Appt	85	88	85	85	85
Recall	27	34	25	25	25
Total	544	579	596	613	630

Source: OP-130D

TABLE XXV

Minority Officer Accession Plan - Hispanic

Source	Fiscal Year				
	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
USNA	33	28	38	46	50
ROTC	25	35	45	55	65
OCS	90	95	95	95	95
AOCS	65	70	70	70	70
Enl Comm	24	28	25	25	25
Dir Appt	70	70	65	65	65
Recall	26	30	30	23	20
Total	333	356	368	379	390

Source: OP-130D

minority accession goals represent 15 percent to 17 percent of total accession goals for the next five years.

Furthermore, the participation rates at the Naval Academy are important indicators of minority progress within the Navy. It is from this source that the overwhelming majority of flag-rank officers, (those officers in the ranks of Commodore and above) are obtained. The importance of this source is further emphasized when only the unrestricted line (URL) admirals, who alone are eligible to command the

TABLE XXVI
Minority Officer Accession Plan - Other

	Fiscal Year				
Source	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
USNA	32	32	33	34	35
ROTC	23	27	31	33	33
OCS	24	25	27	28	29
AOCS	16	18	19	19	20
Enl Comm	14	14	14	14	14
Dir Appt	12	12	12	12	12
Recall	7	7	7	7	7
Total	128	135	143	147	150

Source: OP-130D

operational units of the Navy and make and implement policy decisions, are taken into account.

All current URL four-star admirals are academy graduates. Additionally, two-thirds of the current three-star URL admirals come from this source. Half of all one-and two-star URL admirals are academy graduates [Ref. 7]. This preponderance of academy graduates in the flag-officer ranks has prevailed throughout the twentieth century.

Table XXVII shows the representation of minorities among the entering classes of the three military academies starting one year prior to the All-Volunteer Force; the class of 1976 entered the academies in 1972. There have been significant fluctuations in Naval Academy minority admissions. The black percentage of total minorities has fallen from a high of 76 percent in the classes of 1976 and 1977 to a steady 32 percent to 36 percent in the classes of 1983-1987. Table XXVIII shows the drop-off in USNA black admissions. (Similar data for the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAF), in graph format, are included in appendix (B)).

No such drop-off occurs in the admissions of either of the other two academies. Starting with the class of

TABLE XXVII

Minority Academy Admissions, 1972-1983

CLASS -----	USNA Tot%	USMA Tot%	USAFA Tot%	USNA Blk%	USMA Blk%	USAFA Blk%
1976	7.0	8.0	6.4	5.5	3.6	3.1
1977	10.2	10.0	6.0	7.8	5.8	3.1
1978	11.8	11.2	8.3	5.9	6.1	3.6
1979	11.4	10.0	11.7	4.1	6.8	4.0
1980	11.9	11.2	12.0	5.1	4.5	4.3
1981	13.3	10.8	12.5	4.2	5.7	5.0
1982	11.3	11.6	15.0	4.5	5.3	7.3
1983	13.7	11.4	15.7	5.7	5.2	7.2
1984	14.9	14.1	16.5	4.7	6.3	7.3
1985	12.3	16.2	16.5	3.8	8.1	8.1
1986	15.5	15.4	17.2	5.4	9.1	8.1
1987	13.5	14.8	14.9	5.0	7.8	6.0

Twelve year means and totals

USNA Tot%	Mean = 12.2	USNA Blks Total =	843
USMA Tot%	Mean = 12.0	USMA Blks Total =	1067
USAFA Tot%	Mean = 12.8	USAFA Blks Total =	1009
USNA Blk%	Mean = 5.2	USNA Min Total =	1982
USMA Blk%	Mean = 6.2	USMA Min Total =	2079
USAFA Blk%	Mean = 5.6	USAFA Min Total =	2312

Sources: USNA, USMA, USAFA

TABLE XXVIII

Black Percent of Minority Academy Admissions

1972-1983

Year	USNA	USMA	USAFA
1972	78	46	48
1973	77	53	49
1974	51	54	43
1975	36	63	34
1976	43	40	35
1977	32	52	40
1978	40	46	48
1979	42	45	46
1980	31	45	44
1981	31	50	49
1982	35	59	47
1983	37	53	40

Sources: USNA, USMA, USAFA

1981, entering in 1977, both the Military Academy and the Air Force Academy black percentages have exceeded that of

the Naval Academy. During the last six years, Naval Academy black admissions have been much lower than the other two

TABLE XXIX
Black Academy Admissions, 1977-1983

CLASS	USNA	USMA	USAF A
1981	56	83	75
1982	62	74	106
1983	80	72	108
1984	58	92	117
1985	51	124	119
1986	72	129	121
1987	68	112	86

Six Year Means and Totals

USNA	mean	64,	total	447
USMA	mean	98,	total	686
USAF A	mean	105,	total	732

Sources: USNA, USMA, USAFA

academies. Correspondingly, there has been a rise among Asian/Pacific Islanders admitted into the Naval Academy. Table XXIX shows the number of blacks admitted to the academies since 1977.

Table XXVIII indicates that the Naval Academy has kept pace in total minority admissions with its two sister schools. The issue of the much lower black proportion of Naval Academy entrants relative to the other schools is significant.

An important aspect of ROTC and academy accessions is that persons recruited into these programs are in their teens and usually still in high school. The competition for minorities is easier at this level. As shown in chapter two, the number of minorities with a college degree is still small and much sought after by industry.

The ROTC program is being expanded and two facets of that expansion have significance for minority participation.

A new unit will be opened in an as yet to be determined predominantly black college. More importantly, two umbrella units will be opened in the Navy's two largest fleet centers, San Diego, California and Norfolk, Virginia.

These units will make available an ROTC option for students in the numerous colleges and universities which are located in these two geographic areas. This will give access to ROTC scholarships to people attending schools which otherwise would not offer such a program [Ref. 6]. While not aimed specifically at improving minority participation rates in the officer corps, these changes in the ROTC program should contribute to that end.

The Naval Academy Preparatory School is having increasing success in providing minority officer candidates to the Naval Academy. The overall success rates of NAPS' graduates (NAPSters) of all ethnic groups has been improving and the success rate at NAPS, of minorities has kept pace.

TABLE XXX

NAPS Input and Success Rates at USNA

Class	NAPS Entrants		% Commissioned	
	All	Minority	NAPSters	All
1973	67	2	52.0	64.0
1974	74	3	58.7	65.1
1975	66	8	56.4	60.1
1976	86	14	59.3	61.7
1977	130	27	65.7	67.3
1978	142	43	60.9	65.2
1979	131	27	67.2	70.0
1980	181	38	75.4	72.0
1981	142	38	78.0	72.1
1982	158	28	94.0	76.6
1983	159	47	77.6	76.1

Source: USNA

Table XXX shows the increases in the numbers of minorities who successfully completed NAPS and were admitted to the Naval Academy. Also shown are the percentages of

successful commissionings for NAPS inputs for each class and for all Naval Academy admissions for each class. The successful commissioning rates for minorities from NAPS are not presently tracked by the Naval Academy. This subject should be investigated in the near future.

TABLE XXXI

NAPS Minority Success Rates, 1976-1983

note: table lists input and (% admitted USNA)

Year	Black	Hispanic	Other	Total Minority success rate
1976	35 (57%)	23 (35%)	12 (83%)	54%
1977	18 (72%)	19 (63%)	16 (81%)	72%
1978	26 (65%)	13 (69%)	9 (55%)	65%
1979	52 (52%)	12 (50%)	22 (64%)	55%
1980	50 (40%)	19 (58%)	15 (47%)	45%
1981	38 (50%)	19 (47%)	18 (44%)	55%
1982	40 (80%)	23 (74%)	27 (81%)	79%
1983	52 (56%)	29 (79%)	20 (100%)	71%

Source: Naval Academy Preparatory School)

Table XXXI presents the admissions history and success rates of the ethnic groups at the Naval Academy Preparatory School. The overall success rates of minorities have been improving since 1980. This, combined with the improving overall success rates of NAPsters at the Naval Academy, indicates that NAPS might be an effective way to improve minority officer participation. An additional factor which also indicates that this might be an effective method, is the visibility given to minority officer candidates who enter through this path. This visibility extends both to the fleet and to the general society.

Due to the very small number of successful commissionings obtained through the BOOST program, no meaningful comparison can be made between it and the NAPS program.

V. ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT AND PERCEPTION OF MILITARY LIFE

This chapter examines organizational commitment and perceptions of military life of minority officers in the Navy. In addition, it assesses if and how naval officer minorities differ from their peers in the other branches of the military. To measure perceptions and organizational commitment of officers on active duty, data from the 1978 DOD Survey of Officers and Enlisted Personnel were examined [Ref. 8]. This survey was administered in January 1979 to a worldwide sample of 92,504 men and women on active duty in all four branches of the U. S. military. The survey was not a random sample of members of the military; it was a stratified sample on years of service, grade, and sex within each service branch.

A. DATA BASE

This survey consisted of four questionnaire variants, two for enlisted personnel (Forms 1 and 2) and two for officers (Forms 3 and 4). For this study, those questions from Form 3, which dealt with economic and labor force information, and from Form 4, dealing with quality of life in the military were examined. The sample was narrowed to those officers who were serving in their initial obligation and who had been on active duty less than seven years, in order to ensure that only personnel who had entered military service during the AVF era would be selected for analysis. This reduced the usable sample to 2,580 for Form 3 and 2,576 for Form 4.

Junior officers responding to the survey were classified by race, sex, method of entry (MOE), and branch of service.

For the purpose of this study, race was categorized as black, Hispanic, white, and other. Table XXXII shows the total distribution, from both survey forms, of the sample junior officers in each branch of service by their race and sex.

TABLE XXXII

Sample Junior Officers Branch by Sex and Race

Sex/Race	Army	Navy	USMC	USAF	DOD
Male	----	----	----	----	----
Black	46	26	45	71	188
Hispanic	21	13	19	18	71
White	602	1187	844	1021	3654
Other	29	45	27	32	133
Total	698	1271	935	1142	4046
Female	----	----	----	----	----
Black	22	22	2	30	76
Hispanic	7	4	1	4	16
White	211	440	47	265	963
Other	9	25	0	21	55
Total	249	491	50	320	1086
Total	947	1762	985	1462	5132

The largest number of male and female junior officers surveyed were naval officers. However, there were fewer black and Hispanic males in the Navy than in the other branches of the service. We chose to combine the distributions from both survey forms of the survey in tables XXXII and XXXIII due to the striking similarity of these distributions.

Table XXXIII shows the total distribution of the sample junior officers method of entry (MOE) into the military by their race and sex. Method of entry (MOE) was divided into five categories: (1) Academy, (2) Officer Candidate School (OCS), (3) Reserve Officer Training Corps-Regular Program (ROTC-R), (4) Reserve Officers Training Corps-Contract Program (ROTC-C), and (5) Other. Although females had been

TABLE XXXIII

Sample Junior Officers MOE by Sex and Race

Sex/Race	Academy	OCS	ROTC-R	ROTC-C	Other
Male	----	----	----	----	----
Black	24	39	58	34	33
Hispanic	6	8	12	17	28
White	693	628	425	845	1063
Other	13	25	9	23	63
Total	736	700	504	919	1187
Female	----	----	----	----	----
Black	na	18	32	2	24
Hispanic	na	6	3	0	7
White	na	291	137	55	480
Other	na	8	3	8	36
Total	na	323	175	65	547
Total	736	1023	679	984	1734

admitted to the service academies by 1979, none had been in long enough to have graduated and received a commission at the time the survey was conducted. Therefore, the method of entry titled 'Academy' is not applicable to female junior officers in this sample.

As shown in table XXXIII, the method of entry for almost one-third of the black males and nearly one-half of the black females was through the ROTC-Regular Program. Hispanic and other minority junior officers predominantly entered the military by the other method of entry category. The 'other' category consists primarily of the Health Care Professions (Medical and Dental) and Direct Appointment from civilian status, such as Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps. Only 5.8 percent of the sample minority junior officers were academy graduates; this is important, for reasons previously stated in chapter four regarding the prevalence of academy graduates among flag rank officers.

B. METHODOLOGY

The statistical technique employed in this study to analyze the relationship of race with both organizational commitment and perceptions was multiple classification analysis (MCA) [Ref. 9]. Sex, method of entry (MOE), and branch of service were used as controlling factors. MCA indicates the level of significance of each controlling factor to the dependent variable. The level of significance indicates the strength of the relationships between the controlling factors and the dependent variable being examined. The dependent variables of interest in this chapter deal with organizational commitment and perceptions of the sample junior officers.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT

Measures, used as indicators of a junior officer's organizational commitment to military service, were (1) years of intended service (YOIS), (2) careerist or non-careerist intentions, and (3) staying or leaving intentions. These measures were either direct questions on the survey, as was the case with YOIS, or were constructed from several survey questions.

For careerist/non-careerist determination, a dummy variable was created from YOIS data. Sample junior officers whose YOIS was greater than 19 years were placed in the careerist category while those with YOIS less than 20 years were categorized as non-careerists. A second dummy variable was created for stayer/leaver using YOIS, the number of current years of service (YOS) and the length in years of remaining obligated service. Sample junior officers whose YOIS exceeded their original service contract commitment (current YOS plus remaining obligated service in years) were classified as stayers. The remaining officers were classified as leavers.

Due to the similarities in both survey forms, we elected to concentrate strictly on Form 3 to further examine the individual effects of branch of service, sex, and method of entry (MOE) on each of the organizational commitment measures. When examining these measures by sex, as shown in table XXXIV, we see that, on the average, male sample junior officers (1) had more years of intended military service (by almost three full years); (2) were more likely to remain in the military past their initial obligation; and (3) were more likely to intend on making the military a career than their female peers.

TABLE XXXIV
Organizational Commitment by Sex

Measures	Male	Female
YOIS*	12.99	10.31
Careerist*	41%	32%
Stayer*	60%	53%
Totals	2037	543
*:significant at .01 level		

Table XXXV shows that sample junior officers who were members of the Air Force displayed stronger organizational commitment characteristics than their peers in the other branches of the military. In this table we can see a large variation between the Air Force and the other branches of service for all three measures. We see further that there is very slight variation in these measures when the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are compared to one another. The sample junior officers in these branches exhibited very little difference, on the average, in their level of organizational commitment to the military.

TABLE XXXV

Organizational Commitment by Branch

Measures	Army	Navy	USMC	USAF
YOIS*	11.64	11.81	11.98	13.96
Careerist*	35%	35%	37%	47%
Stayer*	57%	57%	52%	67%
Totals	475	880	488	737

*:significant at .001 level

The last factor examined for its effect on organizational commitment was method of entry. Table XXXVI shows the results of this analysis. Sample junior officers who were commissioned through the academy route displayed, by far, a stronger level of organizational commitment than the officers who entered through the remaining methods. This is understandable, when you consider that the academies have four years to weed out those individuals, who would otherwise exhibit weak organizational commitment, prior to graduation. Sample junior officers, who are graduates of the service academies, would therefore be more apt to display stronger feelings of organizational commitment than their peers who entered the military through all other methods of entry.

TABLE XXIVI

Organizational Commitment by MOE

Measures	Acad.	OCS	ROTC-R	ROTC-C	Other
YOIS*	14.88	13.02	12.49	11.68	11.43
Careerist*	43%	44%	42%	36%	35%
Stayer*	79%	58%	61%	48%	56%
Totals	355	499	333	477	829

*:significant at .001 level

Officers entering the military through OCS and ROTC-Regular Program methods exhibited similar levels of organizational commitment. The remaining methods of entry, ROTC-Contract Program and other, displayed the weakest levels of organizational commitment when compared to the aforementioned methods of entry.

To isolate the race effect on organizational commitment, we analyzed the data using the MCA technique while controlling for sex, branch of service, and method of entry. As shown in table XXXVII, race is not significantly related to any of the three measures of organizational commitment after controlling for sex, branch of service and method of entry. This indicates that race alone does not contribute significantly to variances in organizational commitment levels among junior officers.

TABLE XXXVII
Organizational Commitment by Race

Measures	Black	Hisp.	White	Other	F-signif.
YOIS	12.56	13.03	12.43	11.87	.892
Careerist	41%	43%	39%	38%	.900
Stayer	56%	60%	59%	51%	.391
Totals	128	51	2313	88	----

Tables XXXVI and XXXVII are extremely important tables because they lead to the conclusion that the differences among career intentions among races is not predominantly a racial matter, but a method of entry matter. This finding reinforces the presentation in chapter four regarding methods of entry and resulting career opportunities.

We have seen that there are very definite differences in levels of organizational commitment by sex, branch of

service, and method of entry, and that difference in organizational commitment based on race can not be concluded when controlling for sex, branch of service and method of entry for junior officers. Further analysis was conducted to determine if there were differences in levels of organizational commitment by race and branch of service while controlling for sex and method of entry.

A significant difference in level of organizational commitment by race and branch of service for junior officers did exist for the Air Force when controlling for sex and method of entry. Table XXXVIII shows that race was significantly related to organizational commitment for the Air Force, at the .05 level for YOIS and Stayer and at the .01 level for Careerist when controlling for sex and method of entry. Race was also significantly related to the measure of organizational commitment titled 'Stayer' for the Army, at the 0.1 level of significance when controlling for sex and method of entry.

TABLE XXXVIII

Organizational Commitment by Race and Branch

F-Significance					
Measures	Army	Navy	USMC	USAF	DOD
YOIS	.534	.386	.846	.041	.892
Careerist	.820	.458	.935	.098	.900
Stayer	.053	.374	.879	.026	.391
Totals	475	880	488	737	2580

As stated in chapter four, black admissions to the Naval Academy have not kept up with those of the other two service academies over the past six years. It has already been determined that OCS and ROTC graduates exhibit similar levels of organizational commitment. Also previously

established was that academy graduates displayed much stronger levels of organizational commitment than their peers who entered the military through other sources. Thus a branch of service which relied more on its service academy as a source of commissioning for its officers than the other methods of entry would more likely be comprised of officers with stronger levels of organizational commitment to the military.

The majority of Air Force and Army minority officer accessions enter the military through the academy and ROTC Regular programs; whereas the majority of Navy minority accessions receive their commissions through JCS. Tables XXXVI through XXXVIII indicate that the Navy must improve its position relative to the other two service academies with respect to minority officer accessions in the future if there is to be an improvement in the level of organizational commitment for naval minority officers.

Variables from both survey forms which dealt with attitude/opinion rather than behavioral differences among junior officers were selected for analysis to determine if minority differences by branch of service existed in the area of perceptions.

D. PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY LIFE

The manner in which sample junior officers perceived their environment and life in the military was examined next to determine if and how differences existed between naval minority officers and their peers in the other branches of service in the military. Seven questions from the survey data were selected to examine sample junior officer perceptions of military life. Table XXXIX lists seven of questions, in abbreviated format, selected from the survey forms for this purpose.

TABLE XXXIX
Questions Affecting Officer Perceptions

Form 3

1. Probability of Promotion to the next paygrade.
2. Military Life as expected (5 pt Likert scale)
3. Satisfaction with Mil Life (7 pt Likert scale)

Form 4

4. Current Location: - Problem: - Racial Tensions.
5. Opinion: Racial Treatment (5 pt Likert scale).
6. Racial Group with the best promotion chances.
7. Discrimination: -- the Daily Duty Assignments.

Multiple classification analysis was used to test simultaneously for effects of sex, race, branch of service, and method of entry for each of the questions listed in table XXXIX. The sample junior officers were asked what they thought their chances were of being promoted to the next higher paygrade, and were instructed to respond on a scale (from 0.0--no chance, to 10.0--certain) when selecting their answer to this question.

As shown in table XL, with the exception of sex, all of the remaining controlling factors were significantly related to the perception of promotion chances, at the .01 level of significance. White sample junior officers felt that their chances were significantly better for promotion than did the minorities. This was also true for those sample junior officers who had entered the military through one of the service academies. In addition, members of the Navy and Marine Corps perceived that their chances for promotion were significantly better than did their peers in the Army and Air Force.

The sample junior officers were asked if they thought that military life was what they had expected it to be when they first entered the service. They were asked to select an answer from a 5-point Likert scale (from 1.0--strongly

TABLE XL

Paygrade Promotion Chances*

(Controlling for sex, race, branch and MOE)

----	Average	N	F-Signif.
Sex	--	-	(.413)
Male	9.23	1703	--
Female	9.30	456	--
Race	--	-	(.004)
Black	8.93	110	--
Hispanic	8.96	42	--
White	9.28	1950	--
Other	8.81	62	--
MOE	--	-	(.001)
Academy	9.66	341	--
OCS	9.23	455	--
ROTC (R)	9.47	292	--
ROTC (C)	9.41	403	--
Other	8.83	667	--
Branch	--	-	(.001)
Army	9.11	373	--
Navy	9.35	748	--
USMC	9.49	422	--
USAF	9.01	621	--

*10-pt scale from 0.0 (no chance) to 10.0 (certain)

agree that it was what I thought it would be, to 5.0--strongly disagree). As shown in table XLI, none of the controlling factors appeared to have significance with regard to this question.

The sample junior officers were asked, considering all things, how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the military as a way of life. They were asked to select an answer from a 7-point Likert scale (which ranged (from 1.0--very dissatisfied with the military as a way of life, to 7.0--very satisfied). As shown in table XLII, all factors except for race were significantly related to this question, at the .01 level of significance. The absence of race as a significantly related factor is in itself significant because it indicates that it did not play a role in the level of satisfaction of the sample junior officers with life in the military. All races were fairly homogeneous in their response to this question.

TABLE XLI
Military Life as Expected*

(Controlling for sex, race, branch and MOE)

----	Average	N	F-Signif.
Sex	--	-	(.869)
Male	2.50	2022	--
Female	2.51	541	--
Race	--	-	(.912)
Black	2.56	127	--
Hispanic	2.47	51	--
White	2.50	2299	--
Other	2.49	86	--
MOE	--	-	(.126)
Academy	2.51	366	--
OCS	2.44	514	--
ROTC (R)	2.42	341	--
ROTC (C)	2.59	495	--
Other	2.52	845	--
Branch	--	-	(.154)
Army	2.53	471	--
Navy	2.46	872	--
USMC	2.43	484	--
USAF	2.56	736	--

*5-pt scale from 1.0 (strongly agree)
to 5.0 (strongly disagree)

The sample junior officers were then asked to respond, by selecting an answer from a 4-point scale (ranging from 1.0--serious problem, to 4.0--no problem), as to how much of a problem they felt that racial tension was at their current location. As shown in table XLIII, all factors were significantly related to this question, at the .001 level of significance.

Black sample junior officers were well below the overall average response on this question which indicates that they did, in fact, perceive that racial tension was a problem at their current locations. However, based upon their responses, there was only slight variance in the perceptions of Hispanics, other minorities and whites which indicates that they did not perceive that there was a problem with racial tension where they were currently located.

TABLE XLII

Satisfaction with Military Life*

(Controlling for sex, race, branch and MOE)

----	Average	N	F-Signif.
Sex	--	-	(.001)
Male	4.09	2027	--
Female	4.56	540	--
Race	--	-	(.620)
Black	4.28	123	--
Hispanic	4.42	51	--
White	4.18	2300	--
Other	4.09	88	--
MOE	--	-	(.010)
Academy	4.19	366	--
OCS	4.22	513	--
ROTC (R)	4.47	339	--
ROTC (C)	4.10	497	--
Other	4.11	852	--
Branch	--	-	(.001)
Army	3.97	473	--
Navy	4.14	874	--
USMC	4.65	486	--
USAF	4.09	734	--

*7-pt scale from 1.0 (very dissatisfied)
to 7.0 (very satisfied)

Each of the sample junior officers were asked how close the statements on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1.0--blacks treated a lot better than whites, to 5.0--blacks treated a lot worse than whites) came to their opinion regarding racial treatment in their branch of the service. As shown in table XLIV, method of entry and sex were not significantly related to this question, however, race and branch of service were, at the 0.1 level of significance. The sample junior officers who were black were well above the overall average response for this question which indicates that they perceived that they received worse treatment than their white peers in their branch of service.

When asked which racial group they felt had the best chances for promotion in their branch of service, sample junior officers were instructed to select an answer from a

TABLE XLIII

Current Location: Problem: Racial Tension*

(Controlling for sex, race, branch and MOE)

----	Average	N	F-Signif.
Sex	--	-	(.001)
Male	3.34	1768	--
Female	3.12	477	--
Race	--	-	(.001)
Black	2.82	113	--
Hispanic	3.30	29	--
White	3.32	2010	--
Other	3.28	83	--
MOE	--	-	(.001)
Academy	3.25	322	--
OCS	3.35	444	--
ROTC (R)	3.30	297	--
ROTC (C)	3.40	425	--
Other	3.20	757	--
Branch	--	-	(.001)
Army	3.04	430	--
Navy	3.40	780	--
USMC	3.30	430	--
USAF	3.31	605	--

*4-pt scale from 1.0 (serious problem)
to 4.0 (no problem)

4-point scale (ranging from 1.0--whites have the best chance, to 4.0--chances are equal for all races). The only factor which was significantly related to this question was race, at the .001 level of significance, as shown in table XLV. Black sample junior officers were well below the overall average response for all races indicating that they perceived that their white peers had a much better chance for promotion within their branch of service than blacks in general.

The remaining question selected for this study for the purpose of examining perceptions had to do with whether the sample junior officers had ever personally experienced racial or ethnic discrimination at their present duty station with regard to assignment of daily duties. As shown in table XLVI, all factors were significantly related, at

TABLE XLIV

Opinion: Racial Treatment*

(Controlling for sex, race, branch and MOE)

----	Average	N	F-Signif.
Sex	--	-	(.132)
Male	2.86	1968	--
Female	2.90	545	--
Race	--	-	(.001)
Black	3.76	127	--
Hispanic	2.89	35	--
White	2.82	2255	--
Other	2.77	95	--
MOE	--	-	(.921)
Academy	2.87	364	--
OCS	2.87	494	--
ROTC (R)	2.86	327	--
ROTC (C)	2.89	475	--
Other	2.86	854	--
Branch	--	-	(.015)
Army	2.85	465	--
Navy	2.89	852	--
USMC	2.92	487	--
USAF	2.82	700	--

*5-pt scale from 1.0 (blacks treated lot better)
to 5.0 (blacks treated much worse)

the 0.1 level of significance, to this question. Once again, we see that the response of blacks indicates that they had a stronger perception than any other racial group that they were discriminated against, based on color, in daily duty assignments.

Race has been a significant factor in the majority of questions examined regarding perception of the sample junior officers. The perception of discrimination based upon race was held by blacks, despite the fact that all the branches of service in the military purportedly had strong affirmative action plans which had been instituted in the early 1970s to ensure that all personnel received fair and equal treatment.

To determine if there were any significant differences in minority perceptions by branch of service, controlling

TABLE XLV

Racial Group: Best Promotion Chance*

(Controlling for sex, race, branch and MOE)

----	Average	N	P-Signif.
Sex	--	-	(.211)
Male	3.06	1970	--
Female	3.15	541	--
Race	--	-	(.001)
Black	1.74	130	--
Hispanic	2.95	36	--
White	3.16	2250	--
Other	3.04	95	--
MOE	--	-	(.478)
Academy	2.99	365	--
OCS	3.10	492	--
ROTC (R)	3.07	329	--
ROTC (C)	3.04	471	--
Other	3.13	854	--
Branch	--	-	(.902)
Army	3.09	464	--
Navy	3.10	858	--
USMC	3.08	487	--
USAF	3.05	702	--

*4-pt scale from 1.0 (whites had best chance)
to 4.0 (chances equal all races)

for sex and method of entry, each question from table XXXIX was re-examined specifically for each race, using multiple classification analysis. The results of this analysis are shown for blacks, Hispanics and others (non-black, non-Hispanic minority) in tables XLVII through XLIX, respectively.

With one exception, racial group attitudes did not vary significantly by branch of service. The one exception is found in table XLIX, where it can be seen that the opinion that racial tension was a problem was significantly related to Army, at the .05 level of significance.

E. CONCLUSION

The data suggests that members of the Air Force differ significantly in their level of organizational commitment

TABLE XLVI

Discrimination: Daily Duty Assignments*

(Controlling for sex, race, branch and MOE)

----	Average	N	F-Signif.
Sex	--	-	(.029)
Male	.05	1981	--
Female	.08	552	--
Race	--	-	(.001)
Black	.30	127	--
Hispanic	.02	35	--
White	.05	2273	--
Other	.09	97	--
MOE	--	-	(.003)
Academy	.04	365	--
OCS	.07	498	--
ROTC (R)	.10	332	--
ROTC (C)	.06	478	--
Other	.05	859	--
Branch	--	-	(.027)
Army	.09	467	--
Navy	.05	867	--
USMC	.07	487	--
USAF	.06	712	--

*binary 0.0 (no) -- 1.0 (yes)

TABLE XLVII

Perceptions of Minority Officers by Branch, Blacks

Survey Questions	Army	Navy	USMC	USAF	F-Signif.
1. Prob of Promotion	8.92	9.55	8.99	8.64	.463
2. Mil Life as Exptd	2.60	2.47	2.69	2.52	.911
3. Sat with Mil Life	4.40	4.08	4.33	4.41	.912
4. Current Loc. Prob	2.54	3.15	2.98	2.14	.161
5. Racial Treatment.	3.65	3.97	3.69	3.75	.242
6. Best Promo Chance	1.74	1.54	1.85	1.79	.869
7. Daily Duty Assign	.34	.23	.27	.38	.696

from their peers in the other branches of service in the military. It also appears that race is significantly related to the level of organizational commitment of Air Force junior officers. It has been determined that differences in level of organizational commitment among junior officers was predominantly related to method of entry rather than race.

TABLE XLVIII

Perceptions of Minority Officers by Branch, Hispanics

Survey Questions	Army	Navy	USMC	USAF	F-Signif.
1. Prob of Promotion	8.31	9.97	9.41	8.14	.361
2. Mil Life as Exptd	2.78	1.91	2.52	2.33	.212
3. Sat with Mil Life	3.80	5.15	4.99	4.27	.309
4. Current Loc. Prob	2.75	3.14	3.10	3.99	.254
5. Racial Treatment.	2.89	2.74	2.62	3.21	.263
6. Best promo Chance	3.17	3.21	2.29	3.19	.577
7. Daily Duty Assign	.01	.00	.08	.02	.793

TABLE XLIX

Perceptions of Minority Officers by Branch, Others

Survey Questions	Army	Navy	USMC	USAF	F-Signif.
1. Prob of Promotion	8.04	8.61	9.49	8.48	.506
2. Mil Life as Exptd	2.38	2.35	2.23	2.91	.164
3. Sat with Mil Life	3.46	4.30	4.43	3.81	.235
4. Current Loc. Prob	2.68	3.38	3.49	3.36	.050
5. Racial Treatment.	2.82	2.74	2.76	2.78	.982
6. Best promo Chance	3.17	3.19	2.63	2.92	.611
7. Daily Duty Assign	.16	.04	.10	.09	.582

With regard to perceptions of life in the military, differences do exist among minorities in their perceptions, as far as the questions which were selected for examination were concerned. These differences in perceptions did not vary significantly by branch of service. It was, however, demonstrated that black sample junior officers displayed the least positive perceptions of any racial/ethnic group in the survey.

The data which were selected for study did not support the viewpoint that naval minority officers differ in their views of the military when compared to their peers in the other branches of the Armed Services. This is not to say that it has been conclusively proven that no branch differences among black officers attitudes exist. Further analysis of these survey data, possibly examining variables

concerning economic and labor force information rather than quality of life information, as we did, might reveal that differences by branch do exist. Therefore, it is recommended that further analysis be conducted regarding this topic.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

It is clear that the minority segment of the population has yet to participate, to a representative degree, in the officer ranks of the Navy. The measures already taken to increase this participation have resulted, thus far, in a minority officer corps which is proportionately smaller than those of the Army and the Air Force, and very unrepresentative of the minority distribution in the general population. We feel that the following conclusions are warranted.

1. There was no significant participation of minorities in the officer ranks of any of the United States Armed Forces prior to World War II. Commencing with World War II, minority officer participation grew extremely slowly. The impetus for this participation came primarily from outside the Department of Defense, through Presidential action.

2. The minority portion of the 18-to-24 year old segment of the population is growing, at the same time that the size of that segment is declining. It is from this 18-to-24 year old segment of the population that nearly all officer and enlisted accessions are obtained.

3. The requirements of the Navy for increased numbers of officer accessions will, given the declining size and changing proportions of the 18 to 24 year old pool, require increasing the percentage of minority officer accessions.

4. The participation of minority officers within the Navy differs in the following ways from that of the Army and Air Force:

a. Prior to 1973, the Navy minority officer corps increased more slowly than those of the Army and Air

Force. This occurred in spite of the Navy's longer history of enlisted integration.

b. The Army and Air Force have achieved, and maintained, a higher percentage of minority officers throughout the all volunteer era.

c. Black officers in the Navy are underrepresented both in terms of the black percentage of the general population and in terms of the black percentage of the minority population.

d. Non-black, non-Hispanic minorities, in particular Asian/Pacific Islanders, are over represented in the Navy officer ranks relative to their percentage of the general population and minority population and relative to their representation in the other services.

e. The prestige commissioning sources of the Army, Air Force and Navy, the three military academies, have had minority participation histories similar to those of their respective services during the all volunteer era. The black admission percentages and numbers at the Naval Academy have been lower than those of West Point and Colorado Springs throughout this period. Similarly, the participation rates of non-black minorities at Annapolis have been higher than those of the other schools.

5. Black officers sampled in the Department of Defense survey had the least positive perceptions of the service of any of the ethnic groups surveyed.

6. Race or ethnicity was not a significant determinant in predicting differences in level of organizational commitment. However, method of entry did play a significant role in the differences in levels of organizational commitment. Academy graduates, irrespective of race, exhibited the highest level of organizational commitment. It is from this

source of entry that the majority of flag-rank officers are obtained.

7. The Naval Academy Preparatory School is an effective method of entry into the Naval Academy commissioning program for minorities. The overall success rate of NAPS graduates at the Naval Academy has been improving and is presently better than that of the overall success rate of all Academy entrants. The Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection and Training (BOOST) program has not achieved comparable success thus far.

8. The minority participation rates within the Navy officer corps are increasing steadily. The increasing minority accession rates and higher-than-average minority retention rates should raise minority representation to levels commensurate with minority population percentages by the 1990's. The black officer segment will probably be the last minority to achieve such representation.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the present efforts being made to increase the participation rates of minority officers, such as BOOST and the opening of new ROTC units in predominantly black colleges, be continued. Given the increasing size of the minority segment of the primary supply of military accessions and the Navy's growing need for additional manpower, establishing an image, and the reality, of significant minority participation in the officer ranks is a necessity if the recruiting of minorities is to be sustained.

2. It is recommended that the Naval Academy Preparatory program be studied for possible improvement of the BOOST program. Specifically, the narrowing of focus of the BOOST program to supply officer candidates to only a few ROTC

units, rather than to all units, is recommended for consideration. This might allow a more 'in depth' preparation to be given each BOOST student.

3. It is recommended that consideration be given to increasing the number of minority officer candidates admitted to the Naval Academy Preparatory School, and also to increasing the number admitted directly to the Naval Academy itself. A study of the success rates of NAPS produced minorities within the academy should be included as part of such consideration.

APPENDIX A
MINORITY OFFICER DISTRIBUTION DATA

U. S. NAVY 30 June 1973

RANK	OTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
ENS	104	9962	107	291	10464.0
LTJG	70	10870	84	158	11182.0
LT	93	16358	121	99	16671.0
LCDR	73	15214	124	88	15499.0
CDR	31	8096	57	44	8228.0
CAPT	8	3941	23	10	3982.0
FLAG	0	308	2	1	311.0

RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
ENS	0.15	0.42	0.21	0.16	0.27
LTJG	0.17	0.23	0.16	0.17	0.18
LT	0.25	0.14	0.23	0.25	0.25
LCDR	0.23	0.13	0.24	0.23	0.19
CDR	0.13	0.06	0.11	0.12	0.08
CAPT	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.02

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOTAL
379.	64749.0	518.	691.	66337

TOTAL MINORITIES	1588	TOTAL OFFICERS	66337
PERCENT MINORITY	2.4%	PERCENT BLACK	2.4%
PERCENT HISPANIC	0.8%	PERCENT OTHER	0.6%

U. S. ARMY 30 June 1973

RANK	OTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
1LT	772	11382	236	333	12723
2LT	183	14010	240	484	14917
CAPT	282	34045	575	1435	36337
MAJ	92	17595	287	975	18949
LCOL	69	11395	165	656	12285
COL	20	5307	58	100	5485
FLAG	0	488	1	9	498

RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
1LT	.12	.08	.15	.13	.54
2LT	.15	.12	.15	.15	.13
CAPT	.36	.36	.37	.36	.20
MAJ	.19	.24	.13	.19	.06
LCOL	.12	.16	.11	.12	.05
COL	.06	.03	.04	.05	.01

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOT
1418.00	94222.0	1562.00	3992.00	101194.

TOTAL MINORITIES	6972	TOTAL OFFICERS	101194
PERCENT MINORITY	7.0%	PERCENT BLACK	4.0%
PERCENT HISPANIC	1.5%	PERCENT OTHER	1.4%

(source DMDG)

U. S. Air Force 30 June 1973

RANK	OTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
1LT	74	10278	125	332	10809
2LT	75	15501	214	302	16092
CAPT	310	42863	592	983	44748
MAJ	138	21601	240	367	22346
LCOL	75	14022	122	205	14424
COL	18	6004	54	56	6132
FLAG	0	409	0	2	411

RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
1LT	.09	.15	.09	.09	.11
2LT	.14	.13	.16	.14	.11
CAPT	.39	.44	.44	.39	.45
MAJ	.20	.16	.13	.19	.20
LCOL	.13	.09	.09	.13	.11
COL	.05	.02	.04	.05	.03

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOT
690	110678	1347	2247	114962

TOTAL MINORITIES	4284	TOTAL OFFICERS	114962
PERCENT MINORITY	3.7%	PERCENT BLACK	2.0%
PERCENT HISPANIC	1.2%	PERCENT OTHER	0.6%

U. S. Marine Corps 30 June 1973

RANK	OTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
1LT	22	2900	43	138	3108
2LT	15	4304	53	93	4465
CAPT	9	4841	66	74	4990
MAJ	7	2944	41	10	3002
LCOL	1	1499	12	5	1517
COL	1	627	3	0	630
FLAG	0	71	0	0	71

RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
1LT	.17	.43	.22	.17	.40
2LT	.25	.29	.24	.25	.27
CAPT	.28	.23	.30	.28	.16
MAJ	.17	.03	.18	.17	.13
LCOL	.09	.02	.05	.09	.02
COL	.04	.00	.01	.04	.02

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOTAL
55.	17186.0	223.	320.	17784.0

TOTAL MINORITIES	598	TOTAL OFFICERS	17784
PERCENT MINORITY	3.4%	PERCENT BLACK	1.8%
PERCENT HISPANIC	1.3%	PERCENT OTHER	0.3%

(source DMDC)

Department of Defense 30 June 1973

RANK	OTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
O-1	972	34522	516	1094	37102
O-2	343	44685	591	1037	46656
O-3	694	98107	1354	2591	102746
O-4	310	57354	692	1440	59796
O-5	176	35012	356	910	36454
O-6	47	15879	138	166	16230
FLAG	0	1276	3	12	1291

RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
O-1	.12	.15	.14	.12	.38
O-2	.16	.14	.16	.16	.13
O-3	.34	.36	.37	.34	.27
O-4	.10	.20	.19	.20	.12
O-5	.12	.13	.10	.12	.07
O-6	.06	.02	.04	.05	.02

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOTAL
2542.00	286835.	3650.00	7250.00	300277.

TOTAL MINORITIES	13442	TOTAL OFFICERS	300277
PERCENT MINORITY	4.5%	PERCENT BLACK	2.4%
PERCENT HISPANIC	1.2%	PERCENT OTHER	0.8%

Department of Defense 30 June 1983

RANK	OTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
O-1	2976	31325	579	2543	37423
O-2	1238	39403	870	4146	45657
O-3	2944	85731	1500	6668	96843
O-4	1332	48617	522	1635	52146
O-5	713	31505	312	898	33428
O-6	221	14175	123	366	14885
FLAG	6	1024	4	38	1072

RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
O-1	.12	.16	.15	.13	.31
O-2	.16	.25	.22	.16	.13
O-3	.34	.41	.38	.34	.31
O-4	.19	.10	.13	.19	.14
O-5	.13	.06	.08	.12	.08
O-6	.06	.02	.03	.05	.02

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOTAL
9470.00	251780.	3910.00	16294.0	281454.

TOTAL MINORITIES	29674	TOTAL OFFICERS	281454
PERCENT MINORITY	10.5%	PERCENT BLACK	5.7%
PERCENT HISPANIC	1.4%	PERCENT OTHER	3.4%

(source DMDC)

U. S. Navy 30 June 1983

RANK	CTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
ENS	266	9499	173	364	10302
LTJG	251	9587	123	400	10371
LT	1099	18862	172	758	20891
LCDR	538	12503	118	286	13445
CDR	232	7795	48	56	8131
CAPT	62	3868	26	30	3986
FLAG	1	247	1	3	252

RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
ENS	.15	.19	.26	.15	.11
LTJG	.15	.21	.19	.15	.11
LT	.30	.40	.26	.31	.45
LCDR	.20	.15	.18	.20	.22
CDR	.12	.03	.07	.12	.09
CAPT	.06	.02	.04	.06	.03

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOTAL
2459	62361	661	1897	67378

TOTAL MINORITIES	5017	TOTAL OFFICERS	67378
PERCENT MINORITY	7.4%	PERCENT BLACK	2.8%
PERCENT HISPANIC	1.0%	PERCENT OTHER	3.6%

U. S. ARMY 30 June 1983

RANK	OTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
1LT	2296	6791	61	977	10125
2LT	456	11678	241	2327	14702
CAPT	931	28454	474	3304	33163
MAJ	352	15269	167	827	16615
LCOL	192	10040	106	522	10864
COL	67	4397	37	230	4731
FLAG	3	381	2	26	412

RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
1LT	.09	.12	.06	.11	.53
2LT	.15	.28	.22	.16	.11
CAPT	.37	.40	.44	.37	.22
MAJ	.20	.10	.15	.18	.08
LCOL	.13	.06	.10	.12	.04
COL	.06	.03	.03	.05	.02

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOTAL
4301	77010	1088	8213	90612

TOTAL MINORITIES	13602	TOTAL OFFICERS	90612
PERCENT MINORITY	15.0%	PERCENT BLACK	9.1%
PERCENT HISPANIC	1.2%	PERCENT OTHER	4.7%

(source DMDG)

U. S. Air Force 30 June 1983

RANK	OTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
1LT	372	12020	295	1025	13712
2LT	469	13813	443	1214	15939
CAPT	860	33494	790	2347	37491
MAJ	460	17886	227	452	19025
LCOL	277	12127	137	305	12846
COL	90	5333	57	104	5584
FLAG	2	332	1	8	343

RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
1LT	.13	.19	.15	.13	.15
2LT	.15	.22	.23	.15	.19
CAPT	.35	.43	.41	.36	.34
MAJ	.19	.08	.12	.18	.18
LCOL	.13	.06	.07	.12	.11
COL	.06	.02	.03	.05	.04

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOTAL
2530	95005	1950	5455	104940

TOTAL MINORITIES	9935	TOTAL OFFICERS	104940
PERCENT MINORITY	9.5%	PERCENT BLACK	5.2%
PERCENT HISPANIC	1.9%	PERCENT OTHER	2.4%

U. S. Marine Corps 30 June 1983

RANK	OTHER	WHITE	HISP	BLACK	TOTAL
1LT	42	3015	50	177	3284
2LT	52	4325	63	205	4645
CAPT	54	4921	64	259	5298
MAJ	22	2959	10	70	3061
LCOL	8	1543	21	15	1587
COL	2	577	3	2	584
FLAG	0	64	0	1	65


RANK	WHIDIST	BLKDIST	HISPDIST	TOTDIST	OTHDIST
1LT	.17	.24	.24	.18	.23
2LT	.25	.28	.30	.25	.29
CAPT	.28	.36	.30	.29	.30
MAJ	.17	.10	.05	.17	.12
LCOL	.09	.02	.10	.09	.04
COL	.03	.00	.01	.03	.01

OTHTOT	WHITOT	HISPTOT	BLKTOT	TOTAL
180.	17404.	211.	729.	18524.

TOTAL MINORITIES	1120	TOTAL OFFICERS	18524
PERCENT MINORITY	6.0%	PERCENT BLACK	3.9%
PERCENT HISPANIC	1.1%	PERCENT OTHER	.9%

(source DMDC)


Percentage Distribution of Officers by Rank
U. S. Army 30 June 1983



Percentage Distribution of Officers by Rank
U. S. Air Force 30 June 1983



Percentage Distribution of Officers by Rank
U. S. Marine Corps 30 June 1983



(source DMDC)

APPENDIX B
MINORITY OFFICER ACCESSION DISTRIBUTION DATA

1973

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.11	0.05	0.13	0.08	0.08
ACADEMY	0.22	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.07
ROTC(R)	0.16	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.07
ROTC(C)	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
OCS	0.33	0.76	0.43	0.41	0.60
DIR APPT	0.08	0.01	0.08	0.29	0.09
AV TRNG	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.02	0.06

1974

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.10
ACADEMY	0.24	0.07	0.21	0.03	0.08
ROTC(R)	0.18	0.11	0.17	0.08	0.11
ROTC(C)	0.03	0.01	0.0	0.01	0.01
OCS	0.30	0.59	0.32	0.22	0.37
DIR APPT	0.01	0.0	0.02	0.56	0.25
AV TRNG	0.14	0.12	0.17	0.01	0.08

1975

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.33	0.24
ACADEMY	0.20	0.11	0.17	0.03	0.09
ROTC(R)	0.26	0.17	0.25	0.10	0.15
ROTC(C)	0.02	0.09	0.0	0.0	0.03
OCS	0.25	0.43	0.23	0.30	0.34
DIR APPT	0.01	0.0	0.08	0.11	0.06
AV TRNG	0.07	0.04	0.11	0.12	0.09

1976

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.27	0.35	0.37	0.37	0.36
ACADEMY	0.18	0.15	0.12	0.07	0.11
ROTC(R)	0.15	0.14	0.05	0.09	0.10
ROTC(C)	0.02	0.01	0.0	0.02	0.01
OCS	0.27	0.24	0.32	0.09	0.20
DIR APPT	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.37	0.16
AV TRNG	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.0	0.06

1977

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.25	0.20	0.32	0.21	0.22
ACADEMY	0.16	0.18	0.08	0.13	0.15
ROTC(R)	0.18	0.18	0.22	0.07	0.15
ROTC(C)	0.03	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.07
OCS	0.26	0.22	0.19	0.15	0.19
DIR APPT	0.04	0.07	0.13	0.38	0.17
AV TRNG	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.04

1978

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.22	0.20	0.35	0.12	0.18
ACADEMY	0.16	0.16	0.18	0.04	0.11
ROTC (R)	0.16	0.20	0.09	0.05	0.11
ROTC (C)	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.0	0.04
OCS	0.27	0.23	0.14	0.09	0.15
DIR APPT	0.07	0.09	0.18	0.68	0.39
AV TRNG	0.10	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02

1979

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.23	0.38	0.22	0.25	0.25
ACADEMY	0.16	0.0	0.15	0.08	0.10
ROTC (R)	0.18	0.04	0.08	0.03	0.05
ROTC (C)	0.02	0.0	0.05	0.0	0.01
OCS	0.28	0.08	0.31	0.05	0.12
DIR APPT	0.05	0.42	0.13	0.57	0.45
AV TRNG	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.0	0.02

1980

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.26	0.24
ACADEMY	0.13	0.21	0.30	0.19	0.22
ROTC (R)	0.14	0.06	0.0	0.03	0.04
ROTC (C)	0.02	0.07	0.0	0.01	0.03
OCS	0.35	0.36	0.32	0.33	0.34
DIR APPT	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.16	0.10
AV TRNG	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02

1981

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.16	0.17	0.14	0.13	0.15
ACADEMY	0.13	0.12	0.27	0.25	0.20
ROTC(R)	0.11	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.07
ROTC(C)	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.04
OCS	0.36	0.43	0.40	0.38	0.41
DIR APPT	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.07
AV TRNG	0.15	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.07

1982

SOURCE	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER	TOT MIN
OTHER	0.17	0.19	0.13	0.07	0.12
ACADEMY	0.15	0.15	0.25	0.11	0.14
ROTC(R)	0.11	0.04	0.0	0.05	0.04
ROTC(C)	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02
OCS	0.36	0.46	0.41	0.18	0.31
DIR APPT	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.56	0.29
AV TRNG	0.14	0.08	0.23	0.04	0.07

source DMDC

Black Percentage of Minority Admissions
U. S. Military Academy 1972-1983




Figure 4-2

(source USMA)

Black Percentage of Minority Admissions
U. S. Air Force Academy 1972-1983




Figure 4-3
(source USAFA)

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